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SAUDI ARABIA BACKGROUNDER: WHO ARE THE ISLAMISTS? 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Saudi Arabia is at a critical stage in both its struggle 
against terrorism and its on-again, off-again efforts 
at reform, and Islamism is at the heart of both. The 
success or failure of the moderate Islamists in 
providing social, religious and political responses to 
the country's predicament will, probably as much as 
anything, determine the ultimate fate of their radical 
rivals.1  
On the evening of 15 March 2004, Saudi security 
forces killed Khalid al-Hajj, the alleged leader of al-
Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and a coordinator of the 
violent campaign that began in May 2003. The 
following morning, the police arrested eleven 
prominent reformist intellectuals, including several 
Islamists who had been pressing for political reform 
and trying to establish an independent human rights 
organisation. Together, these events capture the two 
faces of Islamism in contemporary Saudi Arabia: a 
militant, violent one bent on destabilising the 
Kingdom and forcing its foreign backers to flee, and 
a moderate, progressive one, intent on promoting 
political, social and religious reform. While the 
former has grabbed most headlines, the latter holds 
the greater potential for reshaping the Kingdom. 
In an earlier report on how Saudi Arabia approaches 
the reform issue, ICG concluded: 
Dealing with longer-term challenges and keeping 
violent opposition marginal requires repair to a 
legitimacy that has been severely battered by the 
closed and arbitrary nature of the political system, the 
 
 
 
1 In the usage adopted by ICG, "Islamism" is Islam in 
political rather than religious mode. "Islamist movements" 
are those with Islamic ideological references pursuing 
primarily political objectives, and "Islamist" and "Islamic 
political" are essentially synonymous. "Islamic" is a more 
general expression, usually referring to Islam in religious 
rather than political mode but capable, depending on the 
context, of embracing both.  
concentrated power and wealth of the royal family, 
and the record of financial corruption and profligacy 
of many of its members. This necessitates broadening 
political space, giving more citizens a voice and a 
stake in the system, allowing them to organise freely, 
strengthening political institutions, creating a sense of 
accountability and cracking down on corruption.2
The findings of this briefing, which examines the 
genealogy of Saudi Arabia's various Islamist 
groupings and is based on dozens of interviews in 
the country between March and May 2004, strongly 
support that conclusion.  
Beneath the all-encompassing Wahhabi influence, 
Saudi Islamism developed over several decades a 
wide variety of strains. These included radical 
preachers, who condemned what they considered the 
regime's deviation from the principles of Islam and its 
submission to the U.S.; social reformers, convinced of 
the need to modernise educational and religious 
practices and challenging the puritan strand of Islam 
that dominates the Kingdom; political reformers, who 
gave priority to such issues as popular participation, 
institution-building, constitutionalisation of the 
monarchy, and elections; and jihadist activists, for the 
most part formed in Afghanistan and who gradually 
brought their violent struggle against Western -- in 
particular U.S. -- influence to their homeland.  
By the late 1990s, the Islamist field was increasingly 
polarised between two principal strands. Among the 
so-called new Islamists, political reformers sought to 
form the broadest possible centrist coalition, cutting 
across religious and intellectual lines and 
encompassing progressive Sunni Islamists, liberals, 
and Shiites. More recently, they have sought to 
 
2 ICG Middle East Report N°28, Can Saudi Arabia Reform 
Itself?, 14 July 2004, p. ii. The recommendations from that 
report are reproduced in Appendix B below. 
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include as well elements of the more conservative but 
highly popular sahwa, the group of shaykhs, 
professors and Islamic students that had come to 
prominence a decade earlier by denouncing the state's 
failure to conform to Islamic values, widespread 
corruption, and subservience to the U.S. Through 
petitions to Crown Prince Abdallah -- the Kingdom's 
de facto ruler - they formulated demands for political 
and social liberalisation. Their surprising ability to 
coalesce a diverse group prompted the government -- 
which initially had been conciliatory -- to signal by 
the arrests cited above that there were limits to its 
tolerance. 
The other, jihadi, face of Saudi Islamism has 
manifested itself most prominently since early 2003, 
when a network of hardened militant Islamists 
operating under the name of "Al-Qaeda on the 
Arabian Peninsula" (QAP) began a violent campaign 
targeting Western and in particular U.S. interests. 
Large-scale terrorist operations and lower-level 
violence against Westerners have undermined the 
traditional sense of personal security among 
expatriate workers, prompting an unknown number 
to depart. In the process, militants have been drawn 
into a full-blown confrontation with the government 
and its security forces. While its ultimate outcome is 
unclear, there are strong indications the government 
has gained the upper hand; despite highly visible 
attacks in May and June 2004, the militants appear 
to have suffered significant setbacks that leave them 
both operationally weaker and politically 
marginalised. Their remaining core of fighters may 
well retain the ability to exploit weaknesses in Saudi 
security and counterterrorism capability, but they 
have not come close to triggering a broader Islamist 
insurrection or threatening regime stability.  
But victory over the QAP would not mean the defeat 
of violent Islamism, which feeds on political, social 
and economic dissatisfaction that preceded the rise of 
that group and will undoubtedly outlive it. Ferment 
within the Islamist arena, growing strength of a 
progressive, reformist outlook and the deepening rift 
between violent and non-violent activists present an 
important opportunity to address these underlying 
sources of anger.  
In order not to lose that opportunity, the regime 
should: 
? build bridges to the centrist coalition, allowing 
progressive Islamists to express their views 
more openly, including on national television 
and radio; 
? release promptly the reformers arrested in the 
March 2004 crackdown;  
? continue the National Dialogues, initiated in 
2003, enlarge them to embrace a greater 
number of reformist Islamists, and start a 
serious discussion over a gradual political 
opening leading to a constitutional monarchy, 
including expansion of the powers of the 
appointed consultative council (majlis); and 
? combine such political steps with a sustained 
effort to fight corruption, poverty and exclusion 
(especially in peripheral, under-developed 
regions such as Asir) as the best guarantee 
against violence and for long-term stability. 
Amman/Riyadh/Brussels, 21 September 2004 
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I. A SURVEY OF SAUDI ISLAMISM3 
A. WAHHABISM 
The term Wahhabism refers to the religious revivalist 
movement initiated in Najd (central Arabia) in the 
early eighteenth century by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab. Denouncing Islam's perversion over the 
centuries and Muslim societies' renewed descent into 
the state of ignorance (jahiliyya) that characterised the 
Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam, he 
preached a return to tawhid (exclusive worship of 
God) and the early practices of the "pious ancestors" 
(al-salaf al-salih).4 The remedy, he argued, was to 
bypass Islam's centuries-old legal and theological 
interpretive legacy and rely instead on the Qur'an, the 
Sunna (accounts from the Prophet's life) and the 
consensus of the pious ancestors. Practically, this 
meant eradicating all forms of popular Islam, 
including Sufism, saint worship and Shiism, and 
imposing ritual austerity on believers.5  
In seeking to spread his da'wa (preaching), Abd al-
Wahhab found an ally in Muhammad Ibn Saud, head 
of the small town of Dir'iyya (near modern-day 
Riyadh). Their pact in 1744 marked the foundation 
not only of the first Saudi state,6 but also of a local 
 
  
3 For a brief review of Saudi rule, see ibid, pp. 3-4. 
4 Referring to the Prophet, his companions and their 
successors until the third century of the Islamic calendar. 
5 For more on Wahhabism and the history of Saudi Arabia, see 
Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London, 2000) 
and Madawi al-Rasheed, The History of Saudi Arabia 
(Cambridge, 2002). The term Wahhabi is now "overused and 
devoid of analytic significance, serving to describe disparate 
groups and (individuals) across time and space, so long as they 
adhere to an austere or conservative view of Islam". ICG 
Report, Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, op. cit., p. 3. n. 8. 
6 Although both the first (1744-1818) and second (1823-
1891) Saudi states eventually collapsed as political entities, 
the alliance between the Al Saud and the Wahhabi preachers 
remained the basis for the formation of the modern Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in 1932. 
religious establishment entrusted with developing and 
spreading Abd al-Wahhab's beliefs. After decades of 
relative autonomy, the religious establishment was 
relegated to secondary status; today, more often than 
not, it rubber stamps official decisions, issuing religious 
rulings to validate the regime's political stands.7 Among 
these, the fatwas authorising the presence of foreign 
troops (in 1990)8 and peace with Israel (in 1993)9 
cost the establishment much credibility to the extent 
that many Saudis now view it as a mere extension of 
the regime. Still, it continues to provide indispensable 
legitimacy to the Al Saud's rule and acts as guardian 
of the country's official Wahhabi doctrine.  
The influence of Wahhabism extends far beyond the 
religious establishment's official role. Since the 
state's foundation, it has shaped its religious culture, 
education, and judiciary.10 As a result, it has had -- 
to a greater or lesser degree -- an impact on all the 
Kingdom's Sunni Islamist trends.  
B. THE MULTIPLE ORIGINS OF SAUDI 
ISLAMISM 
1. The reformist strain: al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya 
The term al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening) 
refers to the ferment of religious activism and 
enthusiasm that gripped Saudi universities in the 1970s 
 
7 The nomination of Shaykh Ibn Baz as the head of the 
Wahhabi establishment in 1967, under the reign of King 
Faysal (1964-1975), may be considered the turning point in 
its subordination to the regime. 
8 This first ruling was given in August 1990, a few days after 
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, by the Council of 
Senior Ulama (hay'at kibar al-ulama), the highest institution 
in the Wahhabi religious establishment.  
9 This ruling was provided by the Kingdom's top mufti, 
Shaykh Ibn Baz himself, on 13 September 1993. 
10 Wahhabism is by no means the only Muslim denomination 
in Saudi Arabia. In fact, the country's population is one of the 
most diverse in the Middle East in this respect: Saudi Arabia 
has Sunnis belonging to all four jurisprudential schools, Sufis 
and separate branches of Shiism.  
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and 1980s but its roots lie deeper. From the 1960s 
onwards, Saudi Arabia gradually expanded its contacts 
with the outside world, exposing its citizens to broader 
political debates at a time of regional radicalisation 
and politicisation. Moreover, the Saudi regime gave 
shelter to a large number of Syrian and Egyptian 
Muslim Brothers, who were persecuted in their 
home countries by Baathist and Nasserist regimes. 
Pragmatic considerations were one reason: Saudi 
Arabia urgently needed well-trained professionals at 
a time of rapid, oil-induced modernisation. Muslim 
Brothers came to play a key role in the new and 
expanding administration, especially in education 
where they designed school and university curricula 
and were the bulk of the faculty.  
Regional politics were another reason: Riyadh used 
the Muslim Brothers' politicised version of Islam as a 
weapon in its political-ideological dispute with 
Nasserist and Baathist neighbours. According to a 
Saudi Islamist who was then a student, "most of the 
books that could be found in bookshops in the 1970s 
were written by members of the Brotherhood".11 That 
said, some Saudi intellectuals tend to exaggerate the 
role of Egyptian and Syrian Brothers within the 
country in the politicisation of Saudi Islam,12 which 
also resulted from broader regional dynamics.  
Ideologically, the young sahwa Islamists espoused a 
blend of the traditional Wahhabi outlook (mainly on 
social issues) and the more contemporary Muslim 
Brotherhood approach (especially on political issues). 
They distinguished themselves from the Wahhabi 
establishment by their willingness to discuss issues of 
contemporary significance rather than concentrate on 
abstract theological debates. Unlike their official 
counterparts, they also were open to modern 
technology such as the cassette tape, which rapidly 
became their principal means of communication.  
The 1979 take-over of the mosque in Mecca by the 
charismatic Juhayman al-Utaybi -- prompted to a 
large extent by anger at the royal family's perceived 
moral depravity -- was a turning point in the sahwa's 
evolution. Rather than use the opportunity to initiate 
long overdue political and social change, the regime 
chose to strengthen the religious establishment and 
pour additional money into religious institutions as a 
means of co-opting its critics and bolstering its 
legitimacy. The unintentional result was to strengthen 
the sahwa, which used its strong presence in the 
educational sector to take advantage of the increased 
funds  
 
 
11 ICG interview, Riyadh.  
12 See for example Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 13 September 2002. 
Sahwa clerics increasingly participated in public 
debates. They took issue with both liberals, accused 
of undermining Saudi society through secularisation,13 
and the Wahhabi establishment, criticised for its lack 
of interest in contemporary issues and, albeit still in 
veiled terms, unconditional support for the regime. By 
the 1990s, the clerics would go further, denouncing the 
state's failure to conform to Islamic values, corruption, 
and subservience to the U.S., while condemning 
official clerics for their silence on all the above The 
most widely known sahwa preachers who rose to 
prominence in the late 1980s include Salman al-Awda, 
Safar al-Hawali, Ayidh al-Qarni and Nasir al-Omar. 
Broad common features aside, however, the sahwa 
preachers did not present a united front. From the 
outset, there were a variety of undercurrents, some 
closer to Wahhabism, others to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Among the latter are sub-divisions 
between so-called Bannaists and Qutbists.14 Today, 
such divisions are manifested in conflicting positions 
on issues such as relations with liberal reformers, 
Shiites or Sufis, and attitudes toward al-Qaeda and 
other violent Islamists.15
2. Rejectionist Islamists  
Rejectionist Islamists (sometimes referred to as neo-
salafists) have for the most part been either neglected 
by analysts or confused with the sahwa. Unlike sahwa 
reformers, they focused on questions of individual 
faith, morals and ritual practices, as opposed to broader 
social, cultural or political issues, and were hostile to 
the very concept of the nation-state, seeking not to 
modify it but to break with it -- most often through 
withdrawal but at times through revolt. Whereas 
reformers were dominant in schools and universities, 
rejectionists avoided official education altogether, 
seeking religious teaching elsewhere.  
It would be wrong, however, to speak of the 
rejectionists as forming a homogenous social or 
political movement. Indeed, there was far more 
diversity among them in approach and organisational 
structure than among the sahwa. Saudi rejectionist 
 
13 The 1980s were marked by the so-called "modernism" 
debate, which opposed a group of writers and poets calling for 
a reform of Islamic literary tradition and the sahwa, which 
accused them of trying to destroy the foundations of Saudi 
society. See Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of 
Dissent (Baginstoke, 1999), p. 48. 
14 Bannaism and Qutbism refer to the two main ideologues 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna and 
Sayyid Qutb. See ICG Middle East Briefing, Islamism in 
North Africa II: Egypt's Opportunity, 20 April 2004. 
15 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
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Islamism has been variously represented by 
organisations such as the one led by Juhayman al-
Utaybi, which seized Mecca's Great Mosque in 1979; 
fringe communities, which typically withdrew from 
society and adopted a very conservative, puritan 
lifestyle; and informal religious study circles, which 
rejected both the mosque-based Wahhabi and the 
school and university-centred sahwa teachings.  
The rejectionists' most visible and organised 
manifestation was the al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-
Muhtasiba (JSM) movement, which arose in Medina 
in the mid-1970s. Inspired in part by the views of 
Nasr al-Din al-Albani (1909-1999), a Syrian scholar, 
it rejected all schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 
including Wahhabism, insofar as they involved a 
degree of human judgment, adhering instead to a 
literal reading of the hadith (traditions of the 
Prophet's life) as the sole source of religious truth.16 
Disagreements with the Wahhabi establishment 
initially turned on ritual questions; over time, 
however, JSM evolved into a full-fledged socio-
political protest movement whose significance has 
been vastly underestimated by commentators.  
This is explained partly by the fate of the 1979 
uprising, in which a radicalised faction of JSM under 
the leadership of Juhayman seized the Mecca 
mosque. He and his companions were either executed 
or imprisoned, leading many to equate the JSM with a 
short-lived and relatively insignificant, marginal 
group of messianic extremists. In fact, although the 
JSM as an organisation disappeared after the Mecca 
events, the bulk of its basic ideas, notably the critique 
of social corruption and moral decadence in 
Juhayman's writings, outlived him.17 The significance 
of the mosque take-over itself is often misunderstood. 
While some of Juhayman's followers were persuaded 
that his companion, Muhammad al-Qahtani, was the 
Mahdi (the Islamic equivalent of the messiah), and 
the Mecca operation would bring about the end of the 
 
 
16 Born in 1914, Nasr al-Din al-Albani was a Syrian scholar 
of Albanian origin, who founded a school of Islamic thought 
that views the hadith as the sole basis for religious decisions. 
Al-Albani taught at the University of Medina in the late 
1950s but was compelled to leave due to his many 
disagreements with Saudi scholars, notably on ritual issues. 
Nevertheless, he maintained close ties to Saudi Arabia, and 
particularly to the city of Medina, until his death in 1999. 
ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
17 While living in the desert, Juhayman wrote a series of 
articles known as "the Seven Letters of Juhayman", as well as 
much religious poetry. He also made tape recordings of his 
speeches, some of which still circulate in Saudi Arabia. ICG 
interviews, Riyadh.  
world, many others took part in order to precipitate 
radical political and social change.18  
In the 1980s, JSM remnants sought refuge in 
Kuwait, Yemen, and northern Saudi desert regions.19 
A decade later, groups of young Islamists who called 
themselves "students of religious knowledge" 
(talabat 'ilm) and viewed themselves as direct JSM 
heirs still could be found seeking out remaining 
Juhayman companions among desert Bedouins. 
Shunning mosques and universities, they formed 
religious study groups in their homes.20 Although 
they typically lived in Riyadh, often in shared flats, 
they had for all practical purposes withdrawn from a 
society they deemed sinful and from its various 
outgrowths. They regarded the state as illegitimate, 
the sahwa as overly interested in politics, and the 
jihadists as ignorant on religious affairs.  
3. Jihadists  
The origins of the current jihadism can be traced back 
to the participation -- actively encouraged and 
facilitated by the regime at the time -- of thousands of 
Saudis in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. In 
addition to logistical and financial assistance offered 
by the regime to prospective mujahidin -- for 
example, subsidised flights to Pakistan -- the official 
religious establishment declared it a collective duty 
(fard kifayah) for Muslims to fight in Afghanistan.21 
For most of them -- typically teenagers -- 
participation was purely symbolic; the trip seldom 
lasted more than the summer holidays, and many 
never made it across the border from Pakistan to 
Afghanistan. But for those who stayed, the experience 
was profoundly transformative, as they became part 
of the romanticised culture of violent resistance that 
flourished within the Arab contingent of the Afghan 
mujahidin war.  
Two consequences followed. First, these militants 
developed a highly militaristic, violent worldview; 
secondly, they experienced their initial political 
awakening outside their country. Saudi jihadists 
came to Afghanistan with low politicisation and 
little if any domestic agenda or ideological basis for 
opposing the Saudi state; their discourse and 
 
18 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
19 One of those introduced to Juhayman's writings in Kuwait 
was Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who in the 1990s became 
a leading ideologue of the so-called salafi jihadi trend. For 
more on that trend, see fn. 49 and Section III below. 
20 ICG interviews, Riyadh and Jeddah. 
21 Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia at the time, 
issued a fatwa decreeing jihad in Afghanistan a collective duty. 
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activism were almost entirely shaped by and 
oriented toward the international arena. As a result, 
they have had only limited contact with their 
reformist and rejectionist counterparts. In contrast, 
militant Islamists in countries such as Egypt 
originally were politicised at home and so 
developed a locally-focused political program, even 
if they subsequently fought in Afghanistan.22 Also 
in contrast to counterparts from Egypt, Syria and 
elsewhere -- where participation in the Afghan war 
often meant burning all bridges to their homeland -- 
Saudi jihadists were virtually free to travel in and 
out of their country during the 1990s.23 They thus 
retained a home base and were in a position to 
influence Saudi youth upon their return. This 
coming-and-going of Saudi jihadists played an 
important role in the 1990s and 2000s. 
By the end of the Afghan war against the Soviet 
Union, an international jihadist culture had already 
spread to many Saudi Islamist circles but young 
Saudis continued to leave their country in search of 
military training and combat experience throughout 
the 1990s, particularly once al-Qaeda had 
established a training camp infrastructure in 
Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.24 It is difficult to 
characterise the motivations of those who joined, 
though they appear not to have been driven by a 
particular political project or religious beliefs.25 In 
hindsight, former friends and acquaintances describe 
the jihadists as "impatient" individuals who "could 
never sit down to read a book", or "delinquents and 
school drop-outs who thought it sounded cool to 
carry a gun".26 Both reformers and rejectionists are 
at pains to distinguish themselves from those they 
refer to as jihadists. 27 That said, and as illustrated 
below, instances of rejectionists gravitating toward 
 
 
22 Even when in Saudi Arabia, jihadists seldom mingled with 
the sahwa or Islamist rejectionists. ICG interviews, Riyadh 
and Jeddah. 
23 So long as they were not involved in domestic militant 
activities -- and with some notable exceptions such as Osama 
bin Laden -- they were rarely prosecuted. Saudi officials 
acknowledge this; see "Interview with Jamal Khashoggi", 7 
July 2004 at www.jamestown.org/images/ pdf/tm_002_014-
ftinterview.pdf. 
24 In addition to attending training camps in Afghanistan, 
Saudis fought as international mujahidin in places such as 
Bosnia and Somalia in the early 1990s and in Chechnya in 
the late 1990s.   
25 There is still no satisfactory comprehensive analysis on the 
motivations and socio-economic background of the Saudis 
who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. 
26 ICG interviews, Jeddah. 
27 ICG interviews, Riyadh and Jeddah 
jihadi circles and their activism occurred with 
increasing frequency from the early 1990s onwards. 
4. Shiite Islamists 
Although reliable data is unavailable, Saudi Shiites 
are generally estimated to be roughly 10 per cent of 
the total population. They are concentrated in the 
Eastern Province, which is also where most oil 
resources are. Since the integration of the region in 
the Saudi state, Shiites have complained about not 
being allowed to practice their faith freely and being 
treated as second-class citizens.  
Shiite Islamist organisations began to emerge in the 
Eastern Province in the 1970s, but the process 
accelerated with the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
Angered by their social and political situation and 
invigorated by that uprising, thousands celebrated 
Ashura28 despite the official ban. The ensuing 
heavy-handed response led to violent confrontations 
and a revolt that was brutally crushed by the 
National Guard.29 Few Shiite activists remained in 
Saudi Arabia, and those who did were silenced by 
the regime; most fled to Syria, Iran, Great Britain or 
the U.S. By the late 1980s, many had moderated 
their views, distancing themselves from Khomeini-
type agendas and embracing principles of political 
pluralism and democracy.30 In 1993, the Saudi 
government reached an agreement with the exiled 
activists, pursuant to which many returned.31 Until 
recently, they had a relatively low profile. 
C. THE GULF WAR'S IMPACT (1990-1996) 
The 1990-1991 Gulf war was the most critical event 
in the history of Saudi Islamism and helps explain 
subsequent domestic politics. Riyadh responded to 
Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by inviting a 
U.S.-led multinational force to be stationed on its 
territory, a decision that unsettled the nation's already 
fragile internal balance and set off the sahwa's further 
politicisation and radicalisation. Reformist preachers 
no longer restricted their criticism to liberal 
intellectuals or the Wahhabi establishment but began 
directly to target the state and its institutions 
 
28 A Shiite festival. 
29 See Madawi al-Rasheed, "The Shi'a of Saudi Arabia: a 
Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity", British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 25, n°1, 1998.  
30 ICG interviews, Eastern Province. 
31 See Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, op. 
cit., pp. 198-199. 
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The sahwa clerics Salman al-Awda and Safar al-
Hawali delivered fervent sermons criticising the state 
for allowing an army of infidels on Saudi soil; their 
popularity skyrocketed and huge numbers of their 
tapes circulated throughout the country.32 Openly 
defiant of the regime, they capitalised on popular 
discontent and enjoyed far greater popular credibility 
than the official clerics. Universities -- from the outset 
sahwa strongholds -- were rich recruitment grounds 
for political dissent. Intellectuals would gather in 
small groups organised by Islamist professors to 
discuss the nation's affairs.33 In March 1991, several 
wrote a "Letter of Demands", which eventually was 
signed by over 400 religious intellectuals -- among 
them, members of the official establishment and all 
prominent reformist preachers -- and sent to King 
Fahd. In September 1992, 107 religious scholars 
prepared a similar "Memorandum of Advice". 
Islamists formulated two sets of demands: for rule of 
law, political participation and respect of human 
rights (as defined by the shari'a); and for strengthened 
control by religious institutions over state and society.  
The Islamists' 1993 decision to establish the 
"Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights" 
(CDLR) prompted a government crackdown, which 
culminated in 1994 with the arrests of al-Hawali and 
al-Awda. Their followers' reaction -- a protest rally 
in al-Awda's hometown of Burayda34 -- triggered 
another wave of arrests. Most CDLR members were 
imprisoned; two, Muhammad al-Mas'ari and Sa'd al-
Faqih, fled to London where they established a 
branch of the movement in exile. 
This process of politicisation affected the Islamist 
arena as a whole, in particular the rejectionists who in 
the 1980s had largely eschewed political involvement.35 
By thrusting national and international politics on to 
their doorsteps, the Gulf crisis made their self-imposed 
isolation and apolitical stance far more difficult to 
sustain.36 The government's repression of the sahwa 
 
 
32 For portraits of Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali in 
the early 1990s, see ibid. 
33 ICG interviews, Riyadh  
34 This is often referred to as the intifadat Burayda or Burayda 
uprising. Calling it an uprising may be an overstatement since 
only a few hundred people took to the streets but the country 
had witnessed nothing like it since the 1960s. 
35 Juhayman's group had political aspirations but the 
followers who survived the 1980 crackdown for the most 
part retreated into isolated, introspective lifestyles and did 
not have any identifiable political project. 
36 Due to their extreme social conservatism, many rejectionists 
avoided television, newspapers and radio, all of which they 
considered sinful.  
generated political discussions among them,37 which, 
according to a former member of a rejectionist study 
circle in Riyadh, focused on whether certain aspects 
of the state's behaviour warranted takfir (denunciation 
as impious or an infidel). After the sahwa submitted 
its "Memorandum of Advice" in 1992, debate centred 
on whether the ruling family were infidels.38 In 1994 
-- after Burayda -- the question extended to the 
divisive issue whether official religious scholars also 
had behaved in un-Islamic fashion. The most radical 
members of the study circle, who concluded that they 
had, broke with other rejectionists and joined jihadist 
ranks in early 1995.39 Also instrumental in the 
politicisation of some rejectionists was Issam al-
Barqawi (aka Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi), a radical 
Islamist ideologue of Jordanian origin.40 Based in 
Peshawar (Pakistan), he had ties to the remnants of 
Juhayman's movement and regularly visited Saudi 
Arabia.41  
Jihadists-- in particular Osama bin Laden, their 
undisputed leader since the 1980s -- were also deeply 
influenced by the Gulf War. Ideologically, bin Laden 
originally was at heart a sahwist, whose views were 
 
37 ICG interviews, Riyadh. Bin Laden himself commented: 
"when the Saudi government transgressed in oppressing all 
voices of the scholars and the voices of those who call for 
Islam, I found myself forced, especially after the government 
prevented Shaykh Salman al-Awda and Shaykh Safar al-
Hawali and some other scholars, to carry out a small part of 
my duty of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is 
wrong". Cited in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The 
Age of Sacred Terror (New York, 2002), p. 108. 
38 ICG Interview, Riyadh 
39 Among those who left this rejectionist study circle were 
Abd al-Aziz al-Mu'tham and Saud al-Utaybi. Al-Mu'tham 
was convicted and executed along with three others for 
carrying out the November 1995 Riyadh bombings. Al-
Utaybi is currently a prominent member of al-Qaeda on the 
Arabian Peninsula (QAP). 
40 Born in 1959 to Jordanian parents of Palestinian origin in 
Kuwait and raised there, al-Maqdisi came under the influence 
of exiled JSM members around 1980. He spent two years 
studying religion in Medina in the early 1980s, before departing 
for Afghanistan. His 1984 book The Creed of Abraham (Millat 
Ibrahim), which developed a doctrine of jihad based on 
nineteenth century Wahhabi theologians, established him as 
a prominent jihadi ideologue. During the latter half of the 
1980s, he was based in Peshawar, where he played a key role 
mobilising Arabs for the Afghan jihad; he also regularly 
visited JSM members in the Saudi desert. In 1990 or 1991 he 
published The Clear Exposures of the Infidel Nature of the 
Saudi State, which was widely circulated in Saudi Arabia and 
earned him the wrath of the Al Saud. In 1992 he moved from 
Peshawar to Jordan, becoming a leader of the radical Bay'at 
al-Iman. He has more or less continuously been imprisoned 
since 1996.  
41 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
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shaped by al-Hawali.42 But the invasion of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia's rejection of his suggestion that 
mujahidin be called upon to defend the country against 
Iraq, and, especially, the deployment of U.S. troops, 
constituted a triple jolt and wake-up call. With his 
criticism of the Saudi regime and its alliance with the 
U.S. gaining in intensity, he moved to Sudan in 1991 
and, in 1994, was stripped of his Saudi citizenship. 
Bin Laden was moving in directions far from his early 
sahwist orientation, seeing in the U.S. the primary 
obstacle to political change in the region and even a 
direct military threat to the Islamic Umma (the global 
Muslim community). Criticising individual regimes no 
longer sufficed; by the mid-1990s, he concluded that a 
direct, global confrontation with the U.S. was 
needed.43 In short, the Gulf war triggered a process 
whereby jihadists became both more critical of the 
Saudi regime and more openly hostile to the U.S. 
The most spectacular signs of violent Islamism 
occurred in the mid-1990s with attacks on U.S. targets. 
On 13 November 1995, a car bomb exploded at a 
Saudi National Guard facility in central Riyadh, killing 
five Americans and two Indians and injuring 60. On 22 
April 1996, four suspects confessed on Saudi television; 
they were executed a month later. Three were jihadists 
with combat experience in Afghanistan and Bosnia; 
the fourth was a former rejectionist-turned-jihadist, 
who left his rejectionist study circle in Riyadh in late 
1994.44 Neither claimed membership in any particular 
group or organisation, though they said they had been 
influenced by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 
Muhammad al-Mas'ari and bin Laden. To date, there 
is no hard evidence of bin Laden's involvement; the 
widespread assumption that al-Qaeda was involved 
appears to be based essentially on the fact that he 
praised the militants in subsequent interviews.  
The June 1996 bombing of the U.S. barracks in 
Khobar that killed nineteen Americans and injured 
almost 400 people of various nationalities is shrouded 
in even greater mystery. Although Saudi authorities 
claim to have sentenced several individuals in 
connection with it, the perpetrators' identities have 
never been established, and considerable debate 
remains over whether it was carried out by an al-
Qaeda affiliate or an Iranian-sponsored Shiite group. 
There is little doubt, however, that both events were 
 
 
42 Even as late as 1995, his notorious "Open Letter to King 
Fahd" sought to persuade -- not coerce - the Saudi regime to 
change its policies. 
43 In 1996, he issued his "Declaration of War on the United 
States". 
44 ICG interview, Jeddah. 
landmarks in the radicalisation of Islamist dissent that 
began with the 1991 Gulf war.45  
D. IMPRISONMENT AND EXILE (1996-1999)  
Saudi authorities won their battle against the sahwa 
by drawing on a two-track strategy of repression and 
division. By mid-1995, virtually all the most influential 
sahwist leaders had been imprisoned or forced into 
exile in the UK. The "London-based Opposition" 
maintained some influence on politics, distributing 
leaflets and books through an underground network; 
over time, however, it suffered from internal wrangling 
and its distance from the country. In 1996, al-Masari 
broke with al-Faqih and set up the Movement for 
Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia (MIRA). Today, 
their influence is hard to measure, and their in-country 
presence a matter of dispute.46 Regardless, Saudi 
authorities have accused the London-based opposition 
of ties to the current terrorist campaign and have 
repeatedly requested the UK to extradite both leaders.  
In the early 1990s, the regime also sought to split 
sahwa ranks by promoting the Madkhalism movement, 
named after Shaykh Rabi al-Madkhali. Its views closely 
mirrored the Wahhabi establishment's: unconditional 
submission to religious and political authority and 
condemnation of the politicised, heretical sahwa 
clerics. Taking a page from the sahwa, however, al-
Madkhali's disciples used tapes, conferences and, 
later, websites to convey their message, thereby 
countering their foes more effectively than the 
religious establishment. By 1994, the Madkhalists 
reportedly had converted a number of former 
sahwists, including in their Burayda stronghold.47  
Rejectionists reacted diversely to the crackdown. 
Some again withdrew from politics altogether, 
reverting to their original focus on social conservatism 
and puritanism. Upon their release from prison, the 
 
45 See J. Teitelbaum, "Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's 
Islamic Opposition", Washington Institute For Near East 
Policy, 2000 for a discussion of these attacks. 
46 On 14 October 2003, MIRA's leader, Saad al-Faqih, called 
on his followers to demonstrate in front of the Mamlaka tower 
in Riyadh, site of a human rights conference. Several hundred 
people reportedly joined the rally, surprising observers and 
leading some to conclude that the organisation's presence in 
Saudi Arabia was stronger than previously believed. ICG 
interview with Saudi analyst, London, July 2004. Others 
disagree, noting that not all who attended had come for that 
purpose, that protesters mentioned neither MIRA nor al-Faqih's 
name, calling instead for the liberation of political prisoners, 
and that many participants were relatives of detainees.  
47 ICG interviews, Riyadh 
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more politicised and prominent rejectionists mostly 
either joined the jihadists in Afghanistan or became 
central players in the more moderate, liberal Islamist 
movement of the late 1990s. Finally, many jihadists, 
while keeping a recruitment and fundraising network 
in Saudi Arabia, 48 chose voluntary exile in 
Afghanistan, to where bin Laden had returned in 1996 
to re-establish training camps. They did not return 
until the November 2001 fall of the Taliban.  
E. RECOMPOSITION OF THE ISLAMIST FIELD 
(1999- ) 
As part of a more general -- albeit modest -- regime 
liberalisation, most imprisoned Islamists, reformers 
and rejectionists alike, were released by the late 1990s, 
including, in 1999, al-Hawali and al-Awda. Media 
restrictions were relaxed, the internet was permitted, 
and public political debate, silenced since the mid-
1990s, slowly resurfaced. These developments 
coincided with a recomposition of the Islamist field: 
Several rejectionists (such as Mansur al-Nuqaidan 
and Mishari al-Zaydi) and reformers (including Abd 
al-Aziz al-Qasim and Abdallah al-Hamid) openly 
discussed and criticised their old ideas, proposing 
more liberal interpretations of sacred texts in a 
process of muraja'a (revision). Despite significant 
differences, they formed the core of a "new Islamist" 
outlook.  
Al-Awda, al-Qarni and al-Hawali, all former sahwa 
leaders, toned down their criticism of the state, and 
the regime began to view them more tolerantly. 
Indeed, with the official religious establishment 
largely discredited, sahwist cooperation was 
considered highly valuable by rulers in desperate 
need of religious legitimacy. 
A new radical Islamist trend -- often referred to as 
salafi jihadi49 -- emerged around former sahwist 
scholars such as Nasir al-Fahd, Hamud al-Shu'aybi 
and Ali al-Khudayr. Primarily based in Buraydah, 
they attracted a following among young jihadists and 
rejectionists. After his 1997 release from prison, their 
leading ideologue, al-Fahd, attracted wide attention. 
 
48 Yusuf al-Ayiri, the alleged al-Qaeda coordinator in Saudi 
Arabia who was killed in May 2003, never left the country 
after his return from Sudan in 1994, despite repeated 
imprisonment. He is said to have played an important role as 
a fundraiser and recruiter. 
49 Salafi jihadi is a loose description used to designate an 
outlook that invokes Wahhabi theology to advocate resort to 
violence. In effect, it provided Saudi jihadists with a more 
sophisticated theological framework for their activism.  
Opposing the sahwa leaders' evolving moderation, 
they branded many Saudi liberals as infidels, called 
for jihad against "Jews and the Crusaders," praised 
and justified the 11 September attacks, and sanctioned 
use of weapons of mass destruction against "infidels". 
The regime sought to silence them in 2002-2003 
when their criticism turned explicitly against it. 
The 11 September events occurred when these 
processes were already well underway but they 
accelerated and intensified them. Each trend saw 
added reason to continue on its path: "new Islamists" 
concluded that a more progressive, "enlightened" 
reading of sacred texts was more necessary than ever; 
former sahwa leaders were determined to mediate 
between regime and radical Islamists; salafi-jihadist 
preachers read in the attacks and their aftermath more 
justification for violent anti-Western rhetoric, and, in 
time, for renewed assaults on Western targets in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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II. ISLAMISM AND REFORM  
A. THE "NEW ISLAMISTS" 
From the late 1990s, the new Islamists -- also called 
liberal Islamists -- have been increasingly active, 
both politically and in the media. They can roughly 
be divided into two groupings. 
1. Social reformers  
For the most part, social reformers are former 
rejectionists who turned into vehement critics of Saudi 
social and religious conservatism. Over time, they 
have had access to the influential local newspapers, 
such as al-Watan and al-Riyadh. The best known, 
Mansur al-Nuqaidan, established his name in the U.S. 
with his November 2003 opinion piece in The New 
York Times when he was being sought by the Saudi 
justice system for "anti-Islamic" views. According to 
him, Wahhabism has bred dangerous religious 
extremism and is directly responsible for the culture of 
intolerance and repression that pervades Saudi 
Arabia.50 His indictment extends beyond the official 
establishment to encompass its informal counterparts 
such as the sahwa, guilty in his eyes of promoting a 
closed, puritanical version of Islam rather than the 
more open, modernist interpretations suggested by 
Muslim reformers of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
In May 2003, only days after the Riyadh attacks, 
Khalid al-Ghannami -- another social reformer with 
an activist Islamist past -- published an article 
denouncing the religious inspiration behind the 
jihadists, taking particular aim at Ibn Taymiyya, a 
key intellectual source for Wahhabism.51 Mishari al-
Zaydi arguably has become the most prominent -- 
and provocative -- social reformer, staking out 
controversial positions in his weekly al-Sharq al-
Awsat column.  
Focusing on social rather than political change is, for 
these commentators, vital. Political reform in the 
 
 
 
50 See al-Riyadh, 11 May 2003.  
51 Referring to those who perpetrated the attacks, he wrote: 
"Why did they raise the banner of jihad? Because Ibn 
Taymiyya, the `jihadist theoretician,' decreed that when the 
Prince does not fulfil his duty by promoting virtue, preventing 
vice and proclaiming jihad, it is the ulema's duty to do so.We 
have to say things as they are: these words are a mistake and a 
genuine catastrophe that threaten national unity. To speak 
candidly, today it is with Ibn Taymiyya himself that we have a 
problem". Al-Watan, 22 May 2003. 
absence of fundamental social and religious 
modernisation, they argue, would have disastrous 
consequences. Opposing early national elections, al-
Nuqaidan explains that "Saudi Arabia is culturally 
unripe for such an experiment....Elections today 
would only strengthen Wahhabism and tribalism".52 
In the same vein, Mishari al-Zaydi explains: 
I don't see political participation as the first step. 
That's why I am not enthusiastic about elections.... 
There has to be some kind of political opening up, but 
our society still thinks along tribal and religious lines. 
Its political consciousness has not developed to the 
point where it would elect the most efficient.53
While social reformers' views have been given 
widespread coverage in the West, their impact in 
Saudi Arabia is far more uncertain. Breaking the 
taboo against anti-Wahhabi criticism has undoubtedly 
been important; yet, numerous interviews suggest 
they do not enjoy significant social influence except 
perhaps among the intellectual elite. Even there, their 
youth (most are in their 30s) and relatively slight 
education limit their credibility; not a few of their 
elders suspect they merely seek quick fame in the 
West, mimicking what the U.S. in particular 
desperately wants to hear.54 Such accusations were 
levelled against Mishari al-Zaydi when he appeared to 
back the highly unpopular French law prohibiting 
conspicuous religious signs (and therefore barring 
Muslim women from wearing headscarves) in public 
schools.55 Although social reformers continue to 
proclaim their Islamic credentials and have 
consistently attacked Wahhabism from an Islamic 
point of view, this is becoming increasingly hard to 
sustain in the public eye, and many are now 
considered traitors by the bulk of Saudi Islamists.56 
Even moderate Islamist figures with whom they once 
were close, such as al-Qasim, now tend to distrust 
them.57 Increasingly isolated, social reformers have 
sought ties with more liberal thinkers, such as Turki 
al-Hamad, who for years has developed his own 
 
52 ICG interview, Riyadh. That said, al-Nuqaidan has strongly 
backed the January 2003 petition to Crown Prince Abdullah, 
which called for deep political reforms designed to transform 
Saudi Arabia into a state based on "constitutional institutions" 
and advocated elected regional councils. See ICG Report, Can 
Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, op. cit. Since then, however, he 
appears to have modified his views and adopted a more 
sceptical attitude toward early political reform. 
53 ICG interview, Jeddah. See also ICG Report, Can Saudi 
Arabia Reform Itself?, op. cit. 
54 ICG interviews, Riyadh and Jeddah. 
55 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 20 January 2004. 
56 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
57 ICG Interview, Riyadh. 
 Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists? 
ICG Middle East Report N°31, 21 September 2004 Page 9 
 
 
 
secular critique of the prevailing social order but this 
has only deepened Islamist suspicions.58  
From the outset, relations with the regime have been 
ambiguous. Although the internet gives them a degree 
of independence, social reformers rely on the media to 
attract notice and so remain largely at the mercy of the 
government-controlled press. The regime's relatively 
tolerant attitude makes sense: social reformers can be 
effective critics of the jihadist outlook they once 
embraced; they can offset the power of the Wahhabi 
establishment (or, at a minimum, be used tactically to 
keep the religious establishment from challenging the 
regime); and they are seen as less menacing than those 
clamouring for political change.59 (Indeed, those 
among the royal family reported to be most 
sympathetic to reform -- including the Crown Prince 
and Foreign Minister -- reportedly consider a rapid 
political opening akin to "national suicide".60) Even 
so, there are red lines that, if crossed, bring swift 
retribution: Mansur al-Nuqaidan has three times been 
barred from publishing after writing articles deemed 
provocative.61
2. Political reformers 
Originally, most political reformists belonged to the 
sahwa, though several are former rejectionists. 
Abdallah al-Hamid and Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim have 
been prominent in the dissident Islamist movement 
since the 1990s. After their releases from prison, the 
first in 1995 the second in 1997, they set out to 
develop a more progressive Islamist theory built 
around civil society, popular participation and 
democracy -- all, of course, within the context of 
Islamic law.62 Aiming to reconcile popular 
sovereignty and respect for shari'a, they also urge 
religious reform to relax some of the more stringent 
legal requirements of Wahhabism and make room for 
interpretation where scripture is vague (ijtihad). They 
also support social reform, though with strong residual 
conservatism, in particular on women's issues.63  
Together with liberals such as Muhammad Said 
Tayyeb and Matruk al-Falih as well as Shiites like 
Ja'far al-Shayeb, these Islamist political reformers 
 
 
58 ICG interview, Riyadh. 
59 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
60 ICG interview with government advisor, Riyadh.  
61 Al-Nuqaidan was dismissed from al-Watan in late 2000; 
in May 2003, after a series of articles in al-Riyadh 
denouncing links between Wahhabism and jihadism, he was 
barred from writing for two months; since September 2003, 
he has not been able to publish in Saudi newspapers.  
62 ICG interviews, Riyadh.  
63 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
produced in 2002 a diverse centrist coalition. 
Preaching gradual political transformation within the 
context of Islam and the monarchy, this loose 
network of progressive Sunni Islamists, liberals and 
Shiites, spearheaded the petition lobby.64 The 
January 2003 document described a package of 
reforms, including a constitutional monarchy, rule of 
law, an elected parliament, an empowered civil 
society, respect for human rights, and an end to 
discrimination, in particular against Shiites.65 
Striking a delicate balance, the petitioners carefully 
framed their demands in a religious context, from 
repeated references to sacred texts to the requirement 
that reforms conform with shari'a.   
For some liberals, this alliance with progressive 
Islamists is essential:  
It enables us to exit from the impasse in which we 
have perpetually found ourselves, providing us with 
the Islamic credentials we've been lacking. Plus, 
what is the problem about working together? After 
all, we are all Muslims and patriots.66
Not all agree. A minority fears that the political 
reformers profess adherence to liberal ideas while 
remaining committed to the ideal of an Islamic 
state.67 Conversely, some Islamists -- in particular 
more radical members of the sahwa -- believe they 
are "providing religious legitimacy to a project that 
is un-Islamic".68   
Relations with the regime have evolved. In January 
2003, Crown Prince Abdullah met with petition 
signatories, indicating receptivity to their message of 
political modernisation. Other steps -- convening 
National Dialogues and announcing local elections -- 
likewise signalled an open-minded approach. 69 
Frustrated with the slow pace of change, however, 
petitioners sharpened their demands and, in a 
December 2003 document, requested a three-year 
process to draft and adopt a constitution. This more 
radical demand, as well as fear of an alliance 
between centrists and sahwists and the rise in 
violence prompted a tougher regime response.70 The 
 
64 See ICG Report, Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, op. cit., 
pp. 13-15. 
65 See al-Quds al-'Arabi, 30 January 2003.  
66 ICG interview, Riyadh. 
67 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
68 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
69 For more detail, see ICG Report, Can Saudi Arabia 
Reform Itself, op. cit., pp. 13-15. 
70 The regime's tougher response was not typical; 
traditionally, and when possible, it has opted for negotiation 
and co-option over repression. For example, it waited until 
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reputedly hard-line Interior Minister, Prince Nayif 
summoned signatories to his office, accused them of 
being unpatriotic and threatened them with prison. 
One participant explained that: 
During the hours that followed my return home, I 
was convinced that the police were on their way to 
arrest me. Nobody who had witnessed the anger on 
Prince Nayef's face could have believed otherwise.71
In March 2004, renewed activism by centrist 
reformers -- in particular plans to establish an 
independent human rights organisation -- triggered 
regime fears that the initial steps toward a political 
party were being taken.72 A dozen were arrested, 
including three of the coalition's most active 
Islamists: Abdallah al-Hamid, Tawfiq al-Qusayyir 
and Sulayman al-Rashudi.73  
B. THE SAHWA AND REFORM 
1. Moderation and co-option  
As mentioned, most former sahwa leaders 
tempered their views after release from prison in 
the late 1990s. Some even closed ranks with the 
regime; Ayidh al-Qarni, for example, took an 
official role, getting three extremist preachers 
(Nasir al-Fahd, Ali al-Khudayr and Ahmad al-
Khalidi) to recant on national television their fatwa 
urging Saudis not to help the authorities seize 
wanted militants and to reverse their accusations of 
government apostasy. Others, such as al-Awda, 
while keeping a distance from the regime, 
participated in the first National Dialogue 
sponsored by the Crown Prince. During the 2003 
war on Iraq, both refused to call for jihad and urged 
Saudi youth to avoid any action that could disturb 
domestic peace.74 A third sahwa trend, personified 
by al-Hawali, has been more critical of the regime, 
albeit within bounds -- refusing to attend the 
1994 to arrest al-Hawali and al-Awda, whose harsh criticism 
had begun several years earlier.  
71 ICG interview, Jeddah. 
72 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
73 Al-Qusayyir and al-Rashudi were released some two weeks 
later, after pledging not to be involved in politics. Al-Hamid 
refused to make a similar commitment, and he remains 
incarcerated, along with Matruk al-Falih, a liberal activist, and 
Ali al-Dumayni, a Shiite leader. Their public trial opened on 9 
August 2004. 
74 In March 2003, al-Awda coordinated a statement entitled 
"The Internal Front and the Current Challenge: A Legal 
Viewpoint", which argued that jihad could only be proclaimed 
by established religious authorities. See www.islamtoday.net.  
National Dialogue because Shiites were there, and 
alternating understanding for the motivations of 
jihadists with condemnation of their acts.  
The onset of terrorist attacks in May 2003 was a 
principal trigger of the sahwa preachers' political 
realignment and the clear division within Islamist 
ranks. It forced Islamists to choose sides, and a 
broad segment invoked religious arguments to 
condemn the jihadists unequivocally.75 This lent 
religious legitimacy to the regime's struggle in a 
way the official establishment no longer could.76  
2. The struggle against social reform 
Importantly, many sahwa preachers have (for now at 
least) given up the hopes they entertained in the early 
1990s of spearheading a political reform movement. 
Their sermons avoid frontal attacks against the regime, 
particularly on sensitive questions like corruption, lack 
of representation or the absence of civil rights. Instead, 
they seem most intent on protecting the status quo 
from pressures for social reform, an endeavour for 
which they have found natural allies in the official 
religious establishment. For instance, after the second 
National Dialogue recommended modernising 
educational curricula "in order to guarantee a spirit of 
tolerance and moderation and the development of 
cognitive capacities", 156 religious scholars, 
principally sahwa professors and judges, issued a 
statement condemning this as "contrary to the path the 
State has called for and which it needs more than ever: 
strengthening loyalty to the requirements of faith".77  
In similar fashion, sahwa preachers reacted with 
alarm at suggestions that the status of women ought to 
be revised. The attendance without a veil of Lubna al-
Ulayan (the wealthiest and most prominent Saudi 
businesswoman) at the Jeddah economic forum, 
much like the subsequent picture in `Ukaz showing 27 
unveiled female participants, triggered heated 
reactions from the official religious establishment and 
the sahwa.78 The third National Dialogue in June 
 
 
75 The first such manifesto, published on 16 May 2003 on al-
Awda's website, www.islamtoday.net, was signed by al-
Awda, al-Hawali and al-'Umar; a second, with the same 
signatories, was distributed a few days after the 21 April 
2004 attack on the al-Washm police station. 
76 While the Council of Grand Ulemas also issued fatwas 
condemning the attacks, they had less impact than the sahwa 
manifestos. 
77 See www.islamonline.net and ICG Report, Can Saudi 
Arabia Reform Itself?, op. cit., p 25. 
78 Several days after these events, Abd al-Aziz Al Shaykh, the 
Kingdom's Grand Mufti, stated: "we have followed what 
occurred at the Jeddahh Economic Forum, and we must 
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2004 devoted to women, prompted repeated warnings 
by sahwa preachers. A result has been the emergence 
of a group of Islamist women, close to the sahwa 
preachers, most notably Nura al-Sa'd, who have 
defended the veil and gender segregation.  
In stark contrast to the 1990s, the sahwa appears on 
the defensive, silent about political reform and 
vehemently opposed to social change. However, its 
position is not entirely monolithic. Thus, al-Awda 
warned against "Western-inspired" curriculum 
changes but refused to join the 156 signatories. He 
also is open to dialogue with Shiites, a position that 
distinguishes him and several others who view a 
political alliance with the centrist/reformists as a real 
possibility from the more conservative sahwists.79  
3. A possible alliance with the centrist 
coalition? 
In contrast to the January 2003 petition, that of 
December 2003 was signed by roughly twenty 
sahwists, notably Muhsin al-Awaji, a former CDLR 
activist once close to al-Hawali. Al-Awda also is 
reported to have implicitly backed the text.80 Their 
participation came at a price: the consensus 
document calls for broad political reform but is 
couched in a far more religious tone. For centrists, 
who enjoy only limited popular appeal, the benefit 
from an alliance with credible sahwa preachers and 
their transformation from a purely intellectual to a 
social movement would be clear.81 For sahwists, too, 
there would be potential benefit, allowing them to 
resume political activism while moderating their 
image -- a goal very much on their minds since the 
11 September attacks.82 An alliance between 
centrists and moderate members of the sahwa clearly 
concerns the regime, whose sharp response to the 
December 2003 petition arguably is explained by the 
significant number of sahwist signatories.  
condemn it and refute it….I therefore condemn as strongly as 
possible these acts which I declare contrary to Divine Law, 
and I warn that they will have serious consequences". Elaph, 
20 January 2003. Al-Awda backed the Grand Mufti, while 
seeking to calm things and urging that there be no retaliation 
against the women. 
79According to some reports, al-Awda invited Shaykh Hasan 
al-Saffar -- the long-time leader of the Shiite movement -- to 
pursue discussions. 
80 ICG interview, Riyadh. 
81 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
82 For example, a large number of sahwa preachers, 
including al-Awda and al-Hawali, published an open letter to 
60 American intellectuals in April 2002 expressing their 
desire for peaceful coexistence with the West.  
C. SHIITE ISLAMISTS 
Shiite Islamists take a two-track approach. On the 
one hand, they periodically express community 
grievances. Thus, in April 2003, three weeks after 
the fall of Iraq's Baathist regime, they joined 450 
Shiite activists in signing a letter to the Crown 
Prince requesting an end to religious discrimination 
and establishment of a Shiite religious authority to 
regulate their affairs in Saudi Arabia.83 On the other 
hand, they are at pains to make clear their loyalty to 
the nation, their hostility to any alliance with an 
outside power, and -- in an effort to pre-empt an 
obvious regime concern -- their determination not 
to take advantage of the situation in Iraq.84 Some 
explicitly deny existence of a "Shiite question", 
insofar as "the problems affecting Shiites are those 
that affect the Saudi nation as a whole".85  
By adopting this clear nationalist stance, some fifteen 
Shiite intellectuals, mainly Islamists, were able to join 
the centrist coalition that issued the January 2003 
petition. Among them were Jaafar al-Shayeb, a long-
time campaigner for Shiite rights and Muhammad 
al-Mahfuz. Hasan al-Saffar, the long-time leader of 
the Saudi Shiite Islamist movement, welcomed the 
initiative.86 Even when some liberals balked at the 
December 2003 petition's overly "Islamist" overtones 
and the presence among signatories of prominent Sunni 
Islamists from the sahwa, Shiite Islamists remained. 
This represents a significant evolution in Saudi 
Islamism, insofar as sahwists and Shiite Islamists 
had traditionally considered each other enemies and 
avoided any cooperation on political projects.  
Anxious about the centrists, but far more fearful of 
any potential Shiite separatism, the regime appears 
to view the centrist/Shiite rapprochement as the 
lesser of two evils. This explains why it has for the 
most part spared Shiite Islamists during the recent 
crackdown: none of their leaders has been arrested, 
and the only Shiite who remains in jail, Ali al-
Dumayni, is a liberal activist who has not formulated 
his political demands within a Shiite framework. 
 
 
83 al-Quds al-'Arabi, 1 May 2003. 
84 ICG interview, Eastern Province. 
85 ICG interview, Eastern Province. In this spirit, Shaykh 
Hasan al-Saffar claimed that he had "participated in the 
National Dialogue not as a representative of any particular 
community or region, but rather as a simple member of the 
national elite that gathered to discuss national issues". Majallat 
al-Jusur, vol. 9, May 2004. 
86 ICG interview, Riyadh. 
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By most accounts, community leaders such as al-
Saffar have persuaded the vast majority of the Shiite 
movement of the wisdom of this conciliatory 
approach. More radical factions have in effect been 
silenced. Modest as they may be, the achievements of 
the Shiite community -- most notably the right to 
celebrate Ashura in relative freedom, gained in March 
200487 -- strengthened al-Saffar and the moderate 
leadership while winning over some residual sceptics.  
D. THE STATE OF ISLAMIST REFORM 
Since the late 1990s, Saudi Islamism has given rise 
to two powerful and dynamic groupings of moderate 
reformers. Resorting to petitions and other forms of 
public pressure to move toward a more open, 
constitutional system, political reformers have aimed 
at a broad, pluralistic gathering of intellectual and 
religious strands. They have been largely successful, 
rallying important Shiites and liberals. Their most 
recent effort -- to attract sahwa leaders such as al-
Awda -- would be the most significant, as it could 
herald their transformation into a popular movement. 
To promote that goal, they have had to make their 
rhetoric more Islamic, though core demands have 
remained basically unchanged since January 2003; 
their success and the fear of a broadened coalition 
likely caused the regime's attitude to harden in late 
2003. The incarceration of three leaders -- Abdallah 
al-Hamid, Matruk al-Falih and Ali al-Dumayni -- 
has seriously handicapped the movement.  
Hostile to a swift political opening, social reformers 
emphasise the need to reform and curb Wahhabism; 
in this, they have found allies among Riyadh 
intellectual circles and even some royal family 
members. But their adversaries in the religious 
establishment and most of the sahwa are no less 
powerful. In other words, their potential political 
support is inherently limited. They also could trigger 
an unwelcome backlash: the more (and the more 
provocatively) they push for social reform, the 
fiercer the sahwa's opposition, the more likely its 
alliance with the Wahhabi establishment, and the 
greater the ensuing polarisation of national politics. 
 
87 Reuters, 3 March 2004. 
III. VIOLENT ISLAMISM 
A. A CHRONOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 
The recent spate of terrorist attacks is an escalation 
in the campaign militant Islamists launched in mid-
2003. While acts of violence are hardly 
unprecedented, this sustained wave followed by 
direct confrontation between regime and insurgents 
is. Despite the attack in Riyadh in 1995 and against 
Khobar in 1996 as well as occasional violent 
outbursts in the 1990s and early 2000s, militant 
Saudi Islamists on the whole had focused their 
activities outside the Kingdom until 2003.88
Several factors explain this new domestic focus. Its 
immediate origins lie in the return of hundreds of 
militants from Afghanistan after the fall of the 
Taliban in late 2001, some apparently with orders 
from bin Laden to prepare attacks on U.S. targets on 
Saudi soil. Indeed, there is some evidence that 
operational preparations began as early as 2002.89 
Returning Afghan veterans also found inspiration and 
legitimacy in the radicalised and emboldened views 
of salafi jihadi scholars such as Nasir al-Fahd and Ali 
al-Khudayr. The build-up to the Iraq war and 
escalation on the Israeli-Palestinian front provided 
added political, religious and emotional fuel and 
likely facilitated recruitment. The Saudi regime's 
crackdown on radical Islamists in February and 
March 2003, designed to pre-empt possible militant 
action during the Iraq war, likely triggered the 
decision to carry out operations under the QAP name. 
The 12 May 2003 attacks. On 18 March 2003, a 
bomb exploded prematurely in a Riyadh house, 
 
 
88 That said, there had been a steady stream of low-level 
terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia since mid-2000. See Peterson, 
J.E., "Saudi Arabia: Internal Security Incidents Since 1979", 
Arabian Peninsula Background Note, no. APBN-003, January 
2004. Radical Islamists may well have been behind some of 
these attacks against Westerners for which there have been no 
explanations and no claims of responsibility.  
89 Several accounts published in the jihadist Sawt al-Jihad 
relate conversation between Saudi jihadists and bin Laden 
prior to their return to Saudi Arabia. The obituary of Fahd al-
Saidi, who died in the 18 March 2003 explosion, recounts his 
departure from Afghanistan in late 2001 as follows: "He sent a 
two-line-letter to Shaykh Abu Abdallah (Osama bin Laden) 
asking permission to leave and carry out operations abroad. 
The Shaykh agreed and asked Khalid Shaykh (Muhammad) to 
coordinate the departure for 'the Lion' (al-Saidi) and his 
brothers to go and strike at the American rear bases in the 
Arab Peninsula". Sawt al-Jihad 16, p. 45. 
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leading to the uncovering of a massive arms cache.90 
On 6 May, the police raided another house in Riyadh, 
prompting a gun battle with militants, who escaped. 
The following day, authorities published the pictures 
and names of nineteen wanted militants. On 12 May, 
twelve suicide bombers carried out three near-
simultaneous attacks on residence compounds in 
Riyadh, using explosives-laden cars, killing 30 people 
and wounding nearly 200. This was the most 
significant violent operation in recent Saudi history 
and marked the onset of an all-out confrontation 
between authorities and the QAP.  
May-October 2003. Over the next six months, 
large-scale clashes between police and militants 
occurred throughout the country. While the number 
of killed and arrested militants remains unclear, a 
review of police activity suggests that ten or more 
cells -- mostly five to twenty militants each, in safe 
houses in Mecca and Medina (west), Riyadh and the 
Qasim region (centre) and Jizan (south) -- were 
likely dismantled.91 Nearly all safe houses had large 
stockpiles of arms, explosives and other equipment, 
though it is unknown how many plots might have 
been under way. The QAP lost many mid-level 
operatives, as well as its then-leader, Yusuf al-Ayiri, 
who was killed on 31 May 2003.  
November-December 2003. The militants struck 
back on 8 November 2003 with their second major 
offensive. Two suicide bombers dressed as police 
officers and driving an explosives-packed van forced 
their way into the al-Muhayya residential compound. 
The explosion killed seventeen and wounded over 
120. Because many victims were Arab and Muslim, 
including many children, the operation triggered a 
public backlash. Two weeks later, police in Riyadh 
seized a van packed with explosives, foiling a large-
scale, potentially more murderous attack.  
In December, a faction called the Haramain Brigades 
initiated a new campaign targeting high-level Saudi 
officials. A car bomb reportedly was defused near the 
 
 
90 A series of terrorist attacks against government targets in the 
northern Jawf Province already had been launched in February 
and March 2003 and continued into April. It remains unclear 
whether they were connected to the QAP campaign. 
91 This estimate is based on a detailed review of police activity 
in 2003: in Medina in late May 2003, Mecca on 15 June and 3 
November, Riyadh on 21 July, 10 August and 6 November, 
various unidentified locations in the Qasim region on 28 July, 
5 and 8 October, and Jizan on 15 August. Saudi authorities 
claimed that the QAP consisted of six cells in May 2003 and 
that all but one had been dismantled by mid-2004. See articles 
in Al-Sharq al-Awsat around these dates; The Christian 
Science Monitor, 3 June 2004. 
Saudi intelligence services headquarters, and a leading 
counterterrorism official was shot and wounded. 
According to rumours, an attempt also was made on 
Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, the interior minister's 
son. On 29 December, a small bomb was detonated in 
the empty car of an intelligence services official.  
January-March 2004. Although gunfights between 
police and militants persisted, the pattern of arrests 
and confrontations changed. Aside from one major 
clash at a Riyadh safe house on 29 January, militants 
seldom were found in groups of more than three and 
were discovered on the road far more often than in 
houses. Such incidents and arrests tended to be in the 
Riyadh area. On 15 March 2004, police killed the 
new alleged militant leader, Khalid al-Hajj.  
April-June 2004. The period since April 2004 saw a 
surge in gunfights on roads and at checkpoints, with 
militants increasingly initiating the action. Police 
also reported that militants used heavier weaponry, 
including rocket-propelled and hand grenades. On 
21 April, a car bomb exploded in front of the traffic 
police headquarters in central Riyadh, killing six and 
wounding almost 150. The operation highlighted a 
growing schism among militants on whether to 
attack domestic, official targets. While the Haramain 
Brigades claimed responsibility, a QAP leader, Abd 
al-Aziz al-Muqrin, denied involvement and insisted 
that "the Jews, the Americans and the Crusaders in 
general" remained priority targets.92
As if to underscore al-Muqrin's message, four 
militants infiltrated the headquarters of ABB, a Swiss 
company in Yanbu (west coast) on 1 May, killing five 
employees and raising fears that the QAP once again 
was expanding its geographic reach and going after 
the oil industry. The Yanbu operation was followed by 
a similar one on 29 May in which militants infiltrated 
a residential complex in Khobar (east coast) and, 
going room to room, killed Westerners while sparing 
Muslims. When the drama ended nearly 24 hours 
later, 22 people were dead, while several militants 
managed to flee. From late May onwards, militants 
began killing individual Westerners around Riyadh, 
filming the murder of one American in his own house 
and posting it on the internet. Several weeks later, the 
beheading of another, Paul Johnston, was also posted.  
June-September 2004. On 19 June 2004, police 
killed four senior militants, including their new 
presumed leader Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. Four days 
later, the government offered a limited amnesty to 
 
92 www.aljazeera.net, 22 April 2004; The Guardian, 28 April 
2004. 
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those who surrendered within a month, promising 
they would not be executed and leaving the decision 
to prosecute in the hands of victims' families. The 
QAP rejected the offer, and reportedly only six 
militants, none a key operative, turned themselves 
in.93 The brutal wave of kidnappings and violent 
attacks came to a momentary (and relative) halt in the 
months following al-Muqrin's death. In July and 
August, only three shootouts between militants and 
police were reported -- on 1 and 20 July in Riyadh 
and on 11 August in Mecca -- in the course of which 
five more militants were killed; on 2 August, an Irish 
engineer was murdered in his Riyadh office, the first 
such attack in Saudi Arabia since mid-June. 
The lull may well have been only a strategic pause, as 
militants regrouped. Jihadist magazines such as Sawt 
al-Jihad and Muaskar al-Battar have continued to 
appear with the same frequency, and new ones such 
as the jihadi "women's magazine" al-Khansa have 
been launched, suggesting militant activism persists. 
There also has been a recent upsurge in militant 
activism, including gunmen firing at a U.S. 
diplomatic vehicle on 30 August, shootouts in 
Burayda on 3, 4, and 5 September, which left five 
policemen dead, and two explosions near Western-
linked banks in Jedda on 11 September.  
Still, there is reason to believe that the loss of safe 
houses and arrest or death of key personnel -- 
successive QAP leaders, Sawt al-Jihad editor Isa Al 
Awshan and leading ideologue Faris al-Zahrani -- has 
done more than temporary damage to the QAP. Its 
presumed new head, Salih al-Awfi, enjoys a lesser 
reputation than his predecessors, in terms of 
experience and leadership skills.94  
B. AL-QAEDA ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
(QAP) 
The information on Saudi Islamist militants is 
unusually extensive. Much comes from the militants 
themselves, who have promoted their cause through 
publications and high-quality videos, both well-
distributed via the internet.95 Saudi authorities also 
have been particularly forthcoming with data on 
 
 
93 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 23 July 2003. Seeking to maximise the 
impact of the amnesty, officials linked it to the July extradition 
of 27 Saudi terror suspects from other Arab countries to the 
Kingdom. In fact, there is no evidence these events were 
connected.  
94 ICG interview with Saudi observer and analyst, Riyadh.  
95 The public relations operation conducted since late 2003 
by Saudi militants arguably ranks among the most extensive 
and professional campaigns by a terrorist group. 
militants (though this needs to be treated with some 
scepticism), while local newspapers have been given 
some leeway to carry out investigations.  
1. Organisational structure 
QAP has a loose structure, with militants operating in 
largely separate and insulated groups but viewing 
themselves as part of a single, overarching movement. 
Their collective, organisational awareness is maintained 
by strong fraternal bonds acquired in Afghan training 
camps or through shared experiences as fugitives and 
rebels in Saudi Arabia; a common ideological outlook, 
focused on the need to eliminate the U.S. presence on 
the Arabian peninsula; and a sophisticated media 
apparatus that provides political cohesion and boosts 
the morale of field operatives.  
From the outset, QAP has operated on the basis of 
small cells. Security forces typically find no more 
than twenty militants, often far fewer, in their own 
safe houses and with their own weapons and 
equipment.96 Names used by the militants -- such as 
Falluja Squadron, al-Quds Squadron and Haramain 
Brigades -- most likely designate cells or subgroups 
which over time developed separate identities and 
slightly different strategies and tactics.97 While QAP 
considers Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
its supreme guides, lines of communication with the 
distant leadership in all likelihood have long been 
broken.98 Over time, various militants have been 
identified as leaders, though how much command 
and control over the rest of the network they truly 
exercise is far from clear.99 There is some evidence 
 
96 The militants occasionally use the word "cell" (khaliyya). 
See for example Sawt al-Jihad 15, p. 27.  
97 The Haramain Brigades, which claimed responsibility for 
anti-government attacks in December 2003 and for the attack 
on the traffic police headquarters in April 2004, appear to 
have split from the QAP in late November 2003 over the 
issue of whether to target Saudi objectives. Other cells 
appear to have adhered to the overall QAP strategy and to 
have focused on Western targets, but have developed distinct 
tactical specialties. The infiltration operations in Yanbu and 
Khobar on 1 and 29 May 2004 were allegedly carried out by 
the al-Quds Squadron, while responsibility for the random 
attacks on foreigners in Riyadh in early June 2004 has been 
claimed by the Falluja Squadron. 
98 There are very few if any recent indications of 
communication. In early June 2004, Sawt al-Jihad published 
a "Letter to Osama bin Laden", purportedly written by a 
participant in the May al-Khobar operation and handed to al-
Muqrin who, in turn, was to pass it to bin Laden. While one 
cannot exclude that this kind of contact occurred, it is at least 
as likely that the account was meant to boost QAP morale. 
99 Until his death on 31 May 2003, Yusuf al-Ayiri was widely 
considered the QAP leader by militants and Saudi authorities; 
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that QAP has specialised committees or sub-groups 
responsible for instruction/training, media strategy/ 
production, and religious affairs.  
Despite frequent official denials, the militants' own 
accounts suggests that QAP has had access to training 
camps and instruction centres on Saudi territory, 
generally but not always in remote areas. Most 
probably have been uncovered and dismantled in the 
past year.100 The majority of original QAP members 
attended al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s or 1990s, but with the Taliban's collapse, 
alternative locations were needed. Saudi jihadists -- 
probably led by Yusuf al-Ayiri -- sought to establish 
camps in the Kingdom long before May 2003.101  
QAP's highly professional media bureau appears to be 
one of its most important and best protected units. 
Notwithstanding the group's repeated setbacks and loss 
of personnel, it has published since late September 
2003 the bimonthly Sawt al-Jihad (the Voice of Jihad) 
and since December 2003, a second bimonthly, 
devoted to military affairs, Mu'askar al-Battar (the 
Camp of the Sabre). Some 40 issues have appeared, 
each approximately 40 pages, as well as two lengthy 
and high quality films.102 By all accounts, Sawt al-
his immediate successor is not known. Ali al-Ghamdi, who 
allegedly surrendered on 26 June 2003, and Sultan al-Qahtani, 
killed in Jizan on 23 September 2003, both have been 
described by the Interior Ministry as "key" or "senior" 
operatives, though it is not clear whether they were the QAP's 
formal leaders. By late 2003, Saudi analysts had identified 
Khalid al-Hajj, a Yemeni national, as the new QAP head. Abd 
al-Aziz al-Muqrin who purportedly took over after al-Hajj was 
killed on 15 March 2004. Shortly after al-Muqrin's death on 
18 June 2004, the QAP released a statement declaring Salih al-
Awfi its current leader. He is the only militant from the 
government's original list of nineteen suspects still at large. 
100 Some houses used for instruction were found in cities. 
Associated Press, 15 January 2004. QAP militants who were 
shown repenting on Saudi television in January 2004 
“described how recruits went to a resthouse in Riyadh where 
they learned to handle and clean guns, and how they were 
taken out to the desert for 'training'. Some went to the holy city 
of Mecca where they spent three or four days in a camp 
learning to assemble and fire weapons with the militants”. 
Reuters, 12 January 2004. 
101 The importance of training and preparation is repeatedly 
stressed in the militants' publications. The stated purpose of 
publishing Muaskar al-Battar is to encourage "home 
training" for potential recruits. Khalid al-Sabit's obituary 
claims that he trained in a camp in a remote area of Saudi 
Arabia under al-Ayiri's instruction long before the May 2003 
operations. Sawt al-Jihad, 15, p. 28. 
102 The first film, released on 5 December 2003, was entitled 
Martyrs of the Confrontations in Bilad al-Haramayn; the 
second, Badr al-Riyadh, was released in early February 2004. 
Martyrs shows various attacks carried out in Saudi Arabia 
over the years and pays tribute to those involved. The 90-
Jihad has been instrumental in maintaining links to 
key field operatives while escaping the reach of Saudi 
intelligence services, no mean feat.103 Evidence also 
suggests that editors possess an impressive archive of 
texts, video clips and sound recordings, going back 
over twenty years.104 While it is uncertain where and 
how the magazines are put together, they more than 
likely are edited at separate locations by two staffs.105 
There is little information concerning the identity or 
organisation of the editorial committees.106  
QAP militants also emphasise the role of religious 
scholars for recruiting and propaganda.107 After 
prominent salafi jihadi scholars such as Nasir al-Fahd 
were arrested in May 2003, the organisation apparently 
turned to two lesser known figures, Faris al-Zahrani 
and Abdallah al-Rushud, both of whom subsequently 
were detained or killed.108  
Questions surround QAP's purported international 
ties. According to some reports, several attacks were 
 
 
minute Badr al-Riyadh depicts the entire process of preparing 
and executing the 8 November 2003 attacks on the Muhayya 
compound.  
103 Each issue of Sawt al-Jihad contains articles in which 
militants relate their personal experiences in recent incidents. 
104 Badr al-Riyadh, for example, features recordings of 
speeches by the radical clerics Abd al-Rahman al-Dosary 
(who died in 1979) and Abdallah Azzam (who died in 1989). 
105 Sawt al-Jihad appears to have a relatively large and 
fluctuating group of contributors, while articles in Mu'askar 
al-Battar seem to have been written broadly by the same set 
of people from the beginning. 
106According to some Saudi sources, Isa Al Awshan edited 
Sawt al-Jihad until his death on 20 July 2004. See The New 
York Times, 22 July 2004. Others maintain that QAP's overall 
media director is Saud al-Utaybi. See Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 4 
July 2004. Still others speculate that the communications 
department is led by a group of four composed, in descending 
order of importance, of Faris al-Zahrani, Abdallah al-Rushud, 
Saud al-Utaybi and Isa al-Awshan. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 22 July 
2004. Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin also appears to have played a 
central role. In its first five issues, the lead article of Sawt al-
Jihad was written by a Sulayman al-Dosary; from issue six 
onwards, it was signed by al-Muqrin, who was a regular 
contributor to both magazines until his death. Saudi 
intelligence sources claim that many of al-Muqrin's articles 
were written by others, but signed by him in an effort to 
heighten his credentials as a theoretician. See "Interview with 
Jamal Khashoggi", op. cit. 
107 In an article about how to plan and carry out operations, 
Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin wrote: "Important notice:….It is also 
important to keep the scholars apart and protect them, because 
they have a key role in recruiting young people and collecting 
money, as well as their important social influence and their 
role in inciting the general public". Muaskar al-Battar 6, p. 20. 
108 Faris al-Zahrani (aka Abu Jandal al-Azdi) was arrested on 
5 August 2004; Abdallah al-Rushud reportedly died in the 
spring of 2004 from wounds suffered in a shootout with the 
police in April 2004.  
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planned by al-Qaeda operatives in Iran,109 while 
Saudi authorities have implicated the London-based 
opposition.110 Saudi and international media have 
tended to depict QAP as a constituent part of a 
worldwide al-Qaeda network headed by bin Laden 
and al-Zawahiri. None of these allegations has been 
proved. Accusations about Iran and the exiled 
opposition usually come from unidentified "intelligence 
sources" and appear politically motivated. The link to 
al-Qaeda is firmer, as the majority of QAP militants 
went through Afghanistan and may well have met 
with top al-Qaeda leaders before late 2001. The 
militants, as the name of their organisation suggests, 
most likely see themselves as part of the global al-
Qaeda movement, and there are indications that in 
late 2001 the latter's leadership encouraged attacks 
in Saudi Arabia by returning Afghan veterans. But 
ideological and even personal affinity is one thing, 
operational association another. It is highly 
questionable that al-Qaeda leadership is in touch 
with QAP militants and dictates specific operations. 
2. Size 
Estimates of the number of active Islamist militants 
vary, a function both of secrecy and of definitional 
differences (i.e., whether to include operatives only, 
or also those who provide logistical and political 
support). The two lists of wanted militants published 
in May and December 2003 include 40 individuals in 
all, 30 of whom have been killed or arrested, though 
sources close to Saudi intelligence acknowledge the 
existence of a secret list and suggest that its names 
probably number closer to 500.111 In May 2003, U.S. 
and Saudi sources independently put hardcore 
militants at between 200 and 400;112 aggregating the 
number of militants mentioned over the past year by 
Saudi officials or in the jihadists' own publications, 
one reaches approximately 140 to 150. Others make 
higher estimates. How many active militants remain 
is yet another question, a function of the effectiveness 
both of Saudi security operations (in mid-2004, 
official sources claimed approximately 70 per cent of 
hard-core QAP militants had been killed or arrested) 
and of militants' recruitment efforts. 
 
 
109 Reuters, 23 November 2003.  
110 Associated Press, 4 May 2004. 
111 See "Interview with Jamal Khashoggi" op. cit. Five people 
who appear on the May 2003 list of nineteen also appear on 
the December list of 26, for a total of 40 individuals. 
112 The New York Times, 20 May, 2003. 
3. Ideology and strategy 
Al-Qaeda distinguished itself from familiar jihadi 
thinking by focusing primarily on the "far enemy", 
the "Jews and Crusaders" and principally the U.S. 
Although the "near enemy" -- local regimes in the 
Muslim world -- are considered corrupt, repressive 
and un-Islamic, and therefore ought to be overthrown, 
"the power that propped up these illegitimate rulers 
and desecrated the holy soil of Arabia ... was ... the 
preferred target".113 In contrast, and while it 
undoubtedly views itself as part of the same 
international movement and professes admiration for 
al-Qaeda's historical leadership, 114 QAP represents a 
relative return to the emphasis on the national level. 
Its publications, for example, concentrate primarily on 
domestic matters; Sawt al-Jihad and Mu'askar al-
Battar mention Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan and 
Kashmir but often in passing only.115 The inclusion 
within QAP of former Saudi rejectionists helps to 
explain why it is openly hostile to the Saudi regime in 
ways that go beyond bin Laden's attitude.116 That 
said, so far the focus on Saudi Arabia has been more 
rhetorical than practical, insofar as the militants - the 
Haramain Brigades excepted -- still concentrate their 
attacks on foreign targets. As seen, the QAP has 
sought to limit attacks against Saudi targets, an issue 
that has split the jihadists. 
Tensions between domestic and international agendas 
has played out most prominently with regard to Iraq. 
In the eyes of many militant Islamists, resisting the 
U.S. occupation there is a far worthier cause -- and 
theologically safer -- than fighting the Saudi police in 
Riyadh. Some have accused QAP of undermining the 
Islamist effort by detracting attention from Iraq, and a 
number of Saudi militants apparently have opted to 
carry the fight there. The debate prompted Sawt al-
Jihad writers to argue strongly that -- for Saudis at 
least -- fighting the U.S. locally took precedence over 
joining the jihad in Iraq.117
 
113 Benjamin and Simon, op. cit., p. 118. 
114 Sawt al-Jihad published a series of articles on the al-
Qaeda leadership, including bin Laden, Abdallah Azzam, 
Abu Ubaida al-Panshiri and Abu Hafs al-Misri. 
115 A notable exception was extensive coverage of the 
treatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghrayb prison. More 
recent issues of Sawt al-Jihad and Muaskar al-Battar also 
include a column with more intensive international coverage. 
116 Although bin Laden certainly considers the Saudi regime 
un-Islamic, he rarely refers to outright takfir of the royal 
family in his writings and speeches.   
117 In an interview published in Sawt al-Jihad's first issue, 
Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin explained: "I did not go to Iraq, and I 
will not go to Iraq. I swore to clear the Arabian peninsula of 
polytheists. We were … born in this country so we will fight 
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4. Member profiles118 
Evidence suggests three waves of QAP militants: 
veterans of the 1980s Afghan war; participants in al-
Qaeda training camps, principally in Afghanistan 
between 1996 and 2001; and those recruited and 
possibly trained in Saudi Arabia since 2001. For core 
members, the most important common denominator 
and a key to understanding QAP, is the shared Afghan 
experience either as mujahidin or in training camps.119 
This experience left them with a common ideological 
orientation, military culture and technical expertise.120 
It is far from certain, however, whether and to what 
extent these can be passed on to new recruits. 
Militants mostly have a low education level: the 
majority appear to have left school between the ages 
of fifteen and twenty; only a few seem to have a 
university degree. In some cases, dropping out of 
school was dictated by ideological conviction or 
social pressures rather than intellectual failing.121 The 
average age of militants on the government's list is 
relatively high (around 30), though newer and 
younger recruits are unlikely to be included.122 While 
most members are men who left wives and children 
behind, Sawt al-Jihad has paid attention to the role of 
women, and several articles were written by 
the Crusaders and the Jews in it until we have expelled them 
…", Sawt al-Jihad 1, p. 23, 2003. Muhammad bin Ahmad 
al-Salim wrote an article entitled "Do not Go to Iraq" in Sawt 
al-Jihad 7, p. 23, 2004, while Salih al-Awfi (the presumed 
current QAP leader) called on followers not to go to Iraq. 
Sawt al-Jihad, 8, p. 25. 
118 This section is based on background profiles of 
approximately 50 militants mentioned in Saudi police 
statements and in jihadist publications collected by ICG. 
119 The most senior also at some point fought in other parts 
of the globe in the 1990s, such as Bosnia, Somalia and 
Chechnya. 
120 Articles in Sawt al-Jihad and Muaskar al-Battar demonstrate 
impressive knowledge on the part of QAP's leadership 
concerning asymmetric warfare and ways of maximising the 
psychological impact of violent operations. Of particular note 
are those written by Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Sayf al-Adil for 
Mu'askar al-Battar. 
121 Turki al-Dandani is described as an excellent student who 
had planned to focus on medicine before he turned to religion 
and left school. Sawt al-Jihad 7, p. 33. Saudi commentators 
point to the remarkable eloquence and religious knowledge of 
Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who left school for Afghanistan at 
seventeen. Telephone interview with Saudi terrorism analyst, 
June 2004. 
122 The approximately ten militants who appear on Badr al-
Riyadh (the 90-minute video that documents the 8 November 
2003 attacks) all look quite young, possibly between 
seventeen and 25. 
women.123 Finally, and though it has been speculated 
that economically and politically marginalised areas 
of the country, principally the Asir, 124 are 
overrepresented in QAP, militants come from all 
regions, their names suggesting wide geographic and 
tribal diversity125
 
 
 
123 In mid-August 2004, militants published the first issue of 
al-Khansa, a jihadist magazine for women and a sister 
publication of Sawt al-Jihad. Sawt al-Jihad 13, p. 14. The role 
of women has long been a subject of interest in Saudi jihadist 
circles. See Yusuf al-Ayiri, "The role of Women in the Jihad 
Against the Enemies", available at www.almaqdase.com; for 
articles written by women, see Sawt al-Jihad, issues 4-12.  
124 Ten of the fifteen Saudi participants in the 11 September 
2001 attacks originated from the country's southern regions 
of Baha, Asir and Jizan. 
125 See Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 9 December 2003. 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
The onset of the violent campaign immediately 
gave rise to Western speculation about regime 
stability. The challenge is in many ways 
unprecedented, and militants have undermined the 
sense of security of most Westerners and not a few 
Saudis. But threat assessments have been largely 
overblown, a result of understandable concern over 
the fate of a key oil producing state and the mystery 
that often shrouds events in the Kingdom.  
Overall -- and in strictly military terms -- the regime 
clearly has the upper hand. As of August 2004, the 
militants' terror operations had resulted in over 70 
deaths and hundreds of wounded. An unconfirmed 
number of police and security forces also had been 
killed. In response, security forces since May 2003 
have been fully mobilised: training has improved, as 
has the supply of anti-terrorism equipment; police 
wages have significantly increased;126 and cooperation 
with the U.S. has intensified.127 (There is, unfortunately, 
also strong reason to believe the authorities increasingly 
have resorted to torture for interrogation purposes.128) 
Heightened protection is visible across the country, 
leading some Saudis to complain that the many 
checkpoints and armed guards are giving rise to a 
militarised society.129 This process is likely to deepen, 
given the June 2004 announcement that foreigners 
and private security companies could carry guns.  
Security forces have conducted countless operations 
and raids and arrested between 600 and 1,000 
individuals, including operatives and many well-
known radical preachers. 130 All but one suspect on 
the government's May 2003 list of nineteen has been 
killed or arrested, as have sixteen of 26 on its 
 
 
 
126 BBC News Online, 26 April 2004 
127 The U.S. has praised Saudi Arabia's anti-terrorism efforts 
and "unprecedented level of cooperation". BBC News Online, 
30 April 2004.  
128 Although not an impartial source, Sawt al-Jihad contains 
many references to police torture of Islamists from 2002 
onwards. Amnesty International admits not being able to 
"assess the scale of torture used against those arrested", because 
the organisation is not allowed access to Saudi Arabia.  
129 Checkpoints and armed guards were not common prior to 
May 2003. The heavy police presence is seen by many 
Saudis as alien to their culture and paradoxically contributes 
to a sense of insecurity. ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
130According to the liberal Islamist Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim, 
between twenty and 30 clerics have been arrested.. A list of 
twelve clerics who have been detained was posted on al-
Qal'ah, an Islamist-run web-based message board, on 23 
July 2003.  
December 2003 list.131 Recent low-intensity 
operations (such as drive-by shootings and targeted 
assassinations) may well have been carried out by 
sympathisers as opposed to hard-core operatives, 
indicating relative QAP success in inspiring young 
Islamists to act independently. But they may also 
suggests that the leadership cadre -- all Afghan 
veterans and hardened fighters -- has been depleted 
and that the crackdown has made far more difficult 
sophisticated operations requiring prior training, safe 
houses, and the like.132 Loss of safe houses also 
probably means loss of money, arms and supplies. 
Moreover, there is no evidence of a QAP leader 
recruited and trained exclusively in Saudi Arabia.133  
Saudi counter-terrorism weaknesses, however, were 
on display in the upsurge in militant operations in the 
second quarter of 2004. The Khobar attack in 
particular generated widespread criticism of Saudi 
effectiveness. The police took a significant time 
before intervening, and three militants escaped 
despite the siege. In hindsight, Saudi counterterrorism 
measures appear to have been geared principally to 
the threat of large-scale car bombings in urban areas 
and ill-prepared for the tactical and geographical shift 
the Khobar and Yanbu attacks represented.134 
Repeated police slip-ups and militant possession of 
police and army equipment have fed speculation that 
QAP has support within the security forces or has 
infiltrated them, a charge difficult to verify.135  
 
131 Four of those killed appear on both the May list and the 
December list. These lists do not include the names of some 
of QAP's most important operatives. Between 600 and 1,000 
individuals currently are being held in connection with the 
anti-QAP campaign. Many of these have not been directly 
involved in militant operations but are accused of belonging 
to a wider network of sympathisers. See "Interview with 
Jamal Khashoggi", op. cit. 
132 Recent gunfights have taken place on roads and 
checkpoints rather than in or around buildings, suggesting that 
QAP may have lost most of its safe houses. Some training 
camps are said to remain, particularly in the south western 
regions, but it has almost certainly become more difficult to 
establish them around the large urban areas in the Najd and 
Hijaz where recruitment potential presumably is greatest. 
133 According to a Saudi with strong connections to the 
security services, "99 per cent of the people arrested [in 
connection with the terrorist campaign] were recruited before 
May 2003". See "Interview with Jamal Khashoggi", op. cit. 
134 Other signs of incompetence include the frequency with 
which militants have escaped unharmed from police sieges 
and gun battles. ICG interviews, Riyadh,. 
135 See The Daily Telegraph, 1 June 2004. QAP militants 
have claimed that Saudi security forces assisted them in 
preparing for Paul Marshall's kidnapping. Sawt al.Jihad 19, 
p. 18. According to their version, they were provided with 
police equipment to set up a fake checkpoint. 
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This bloody balance sheet aside, the real question is 
whether violent Islamist militants can attract new 
sympathisers, and whether the Saudi regime will 
implement a strategic approach, both political and 
military, to defeat them. 
To some degree, the regime has understood this, 
diversifying its tactics beyond the strictly military. 
Whereas in November 2003 it categorically ruled out 
all dialogue (including an initiative spearheaded by al-
Hawali and three other Islamists to mediate between 
government and armed militants),136 it gradually 
moderated its position. In May 2004, Muntasir al-
Zayyat, a well-known Egyptian Islamist lawyer, 
arrived seeking to "open channels of dialogue with 
the extremists";137 in late June 2004, the government 
offered an amnesty to those who surrendered within a 
month. In July, Safar al-Hawali allegedly was used as 
a mediator or "contact person" for militants wishing 
to surrender. Shortly thereafter, the government 
announced a two-month period during which illegal 
weapons could be handed in without prosecution.138  
The regime also launched a campaign aimed at 
delegitimising the militants by:  
? mobilising the leading ulama from the official 
religious establishment to preach against the 
militants and condemn their behaviour on 
religious grounds.139 The effectiveness of this 
tactic is dubious, however, given the ageing 
clerics' feeble credibility;140  
? turning the militants' own ideologues against 
them -- as noted, three prominent jihadi 
clerics recanted on camera in November and 
December 2003;141  
 
 
 
136 See ICG Report, Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, op. 
cit., p 24. 
137 www.arabicnews.com, 20 May 2004. 
138 BBC News Online, 24 June 2004; Reuters 29 June 2004. 
139 See, e.g., Associated Press, 21 April 2004; The 
Washington Post, 5 June 2004 
140 One Saudi stated that, "people actually listen to the shaykhs 
out of fear of doing something that is wrong on religious 
grounds", ICG interview, Riyadh. Another dismissed their 
impact altogether. "Nobody really listen to the shaykhs. Just 
look at them, they are so old". ICG interview, Riyadh,.  
141 Ali al-Khudayr appeared on 19 November 2003, Nasir al-
Fahd on 22 November and Ahmad al-Khalidi on 13 December. 
The impression among Saudis is that while al-Khudayr 
genuinely apologised for his earlier pronouncements, al-Fahd 
and al-Khalidi did not. ICG interviews, Riyadh. One of QAP's 
leading ideologues, Abdallah al-Rushud, criticised al-Khudayr 
for retracting his views. See "Hashim al-Taraju'at" [Crushing 
the Retractions], published in December 2003 on the Sawt al-
Jihad website. This perception is borne out by a close reading 
? encouraging sahwa preachers such as al-
Awda to condemn the acts of violence;142  
? highlighting the suffering of innocent victims 
on state-controlled media. Televised pictures 
of wounded and blood-stained victims have 
been very explicit, and newspaper articles 
have focused on bereaved families and 
children killed in terrorist attacks.143 This is 
believed by some to have had a powerful 
impact on public opinion;144 and  
? enlisting the help of outside Islamists over 
whom the regime has some influence -- many 
saw a Saudi hand behind Hamas's condemnation 
of the Khobar attacks in late May 2004.145  
More generally, the regime has taken initial steps to 
curb extremist influence, for example by purging 
textbooks of lessons inculcating hostility toward 
Christians and Jews and initiating poverty-reduction 
plans.146
The regime can build on a receptive base. Gauging 
Saudi public opinion is an inexact science at best, 
hobbled by the absence of credible polls.147 Still, 
ICG interviews and other evidence suggest 
widespread distaste for the violence, particularly acts 
aimed at Saudis, even while many support the 
militant Islamists' rhetoric and worldview. Most 
appalling to ordinary citizens were the 8 November 
2003 attacks against the Muhayya compound, whose 
victims were primarily Arabs and included many 
of transcripts of the interviews, and it almost certainly reduced 
the impact of their words among militant Islamists. On 12 
January 2004, Saudi television also aired pictures of a group of 
militants under arrest who were discussing their recruitment 
into QAP and repenting their crimes. 
142 Five religious scholars (Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak, Abdallah 
al-Jibrin, Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah and Abdallah al-
Tuwayjiri) issued a joint statement in June 2004 condemning 
the terrorist attacks. See Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 14 June 2004.  
143 Sample headlines include "Lebanese Yassir Kanan: 'I 
started helping the wounded but I became confused and 
started weeping when I saw my own daughter among the 
victims'", Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 23 April 2004; "The mother of 
Wajdan, the victim of the al-Washm explosion in Riyadh: 
No one can imagine the amount of pain that Rami's family is 
going through right now", Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 June 2004. 
144 ICG interviews, Riyadh. 
145 Reuven Paz, "Hamas vs. al-Qaeda -- the Condemnation 
of the al-Khobar Attack", PRISM Special Dispatch 3, 2, 1 
June 2004. 
146 See ICG Report, Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, op. 
cit., p. 25; The Christian Science Monitor, 12 January 2004; 
Los Angeles Times, 16 May 2003. 
147 One exception is the survey conducted by Nawaf Obaid 
and discussed in ICG Report, Can Saudi Arabia Reform 
Itself?, op., cit., p. 2. n. 1. 
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women and children. Terrorist attacks and 
confrontations between police and militants in 2004 
seemed to reinforce this perception. Virtually all 
Saudis ICG interviewed used the word "terrorist" 
(irhabi) to describe militants, an unusual designation 
in the Arab world which hints at weak popular 
standing.148 Through their tactics, in short, the 
militants have largely marginalised themselves.  
But with anti-regime feelings running high -- fuelled 
by the closed, arbitrary political system; the 
privileged status of the royal family; widespread 
financial corruption and waste -- violent militants 
undoubtedly retain the ability to attract new 
supporters, particularly among young, radicalised 
Islamists in urban areas, religiously conservative 
locations (such as the Qasim), and areas that 
traditionally have resisted the central state (in the 
south).149 Many of these currently belong to the 
QAP's lower ranks and may within a decade rekindle 
the fight and boast of having participated in the first 
jihad on the Arabian peninsula. Another potential 
recruitment source will be returnees from the struggle 
against the U.S. in Iraq. Unless there is a sustained 
effort to mend the Kingdom's serious political fault-
lines, the militants' appeal will rise as the regime's 
capacity to confront them falls.  
A key test will be whether the regime can unify the 
nation behind a sustained program of political and 
economic reform while continuing to drive a wedge 
between violent and non-violent Islamists. Its 
attempts to coopt sahwa leaders, the convening of the 
National Dialogues, and the announcement of 
municipal elections are tentative steps in this direction 
but more is needed. Overly sensitive to the putative 
political threat presented by the centrists' broad 
coalition, the regime has sought to silence the one 
movement with the potential to bridge the gap 
between Western-orientated and liberal elements on 
the one hand and Islamists and religious conservatives 
 
148 "Terrorist" is a highly charged word in the Arab and 
Islamic world, seen as a label used by Israel and the West to 
discredit the Palestinian resistance. Words such as 
"extremists" (mutatarrifun) or "fundamentalists" (usuliun) 
are generally favoured in this context. In another possible 
indication of popular alienation from the militants, Saudi 
counterterror specialists claim that 90 per cent of their 
intelligence comes from "disgusted locals". See The 
Observer, 20 June 2004. 
149 See Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 22 May 2004. There also is 
reason to believe that public support for the militants would 
rise were attacks directed exclusively against foreigners. A 
young Saudi told ICG: "All the violence against Saudis is 
not good, but if they only attacked American targets that 
would be fine with me". ICG interview, Riyadh. 
on the other as well as to inspire political opening and 
economic modernisation in tune with the Kingdom's 
underlying culture and identity. 
The terrorist attacks unintentionally promoted a sense 
of national unity, whose most discernible political 
manifestations have been popular revulsion at the 
violence and the formation of the loose centrist 
coalition of progressive Sunni Islamists, nationalists, 
liberals and Shiites. The regime should not waste this 
opportunity to implement a genuine reform program. 
Amman/Riyadh/Brussels, 21 September 2004 
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APPENDIX B 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ICG MIDDLE EAST REPORT Nº28, 
CAN SAUDI ARABIA REFORM ITSELF?, 14 JULY 2004 
 
 
To the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia: 
1. Commit to a program of gradual, deliberate 
and transparent political reform by: 
(a) publishing a comprehensive and detailed 
reform agenda, including benchmarks and 
a timetable for implementation; 
(b) enacting legislation providing for legalisation 
and regulation of civic, social, and cultural 
organisations and associations, and in 
particular allowing the establishment of an 
independent human rights organisation and 
freely elected professional unions;  
(c) holding local elections according to the 
announced timetable; 
(d) pursuing efforts to promote national unity, 
dialogue and tolerance between Shiites, 
Sunnis and other Muslim groups in the 
Kingdom; 
(e) expanding the National Dialogue by making 
it more inclusive, outlining and promoting 
their agenda, and permitting citizens to meet 
and discuss key issues outside government-
sponsored gatherings; and 
(f) lifting restrictions on petition writers, 
releasing those under detention and 
permitting public discussion in the media 
and elsewhere by those calling for non-
violent change. 
2. Strengthen institutions and work to distribute 
and check power by: 
(a) expanding the law-making authority of the 
Majlis al-Shura and its oversight over 
financial and budgetary matters, and 
granting it authority to review and approve 
cabinet appointments and the unrestricted 
ability to invite and question ministers;  
(b) establishing a transparent mechanism for all 
government financial and business affairs, 
specifically by publishing and abiding by a 
clearly defined national budget with a 
precise breakdown of sources of state 
revenue and expenditure, subjecting public 
expenditures to independent oversight, and 
listing those in the royal household entitled 
to public funds and publishing such royal 
allocations;  
(c) cracking down on corruption and abuse of 
state power, in particular by members of 
the royal family; and  
(d) increasing accountability by gradually 
separating the royal family from day-to-
day running of the government, appointing 
qualified professionals rather than royal 
family members to executive positions and 
splitting the functions of King and Prime 
Minister.  
3. Accelerate economic and social reform by: 
(a) Intensifying steps to join the World Trade 
Organisation and attract investments in the 
non-oil sector; 
(b) strengthening technical and vocational 
training;  
(c) continuing efforts to better balance the 
education curriculum between religious 
study and professional or technical training; 
and  
(d) actively implementing the decision to 
expand employment opportunities for 
women and abolishing the requirement 
that women obtain permission from a male 
guardian to access jobs, health and 
educational services.  
To Saudi Reformers: 
1. Continue to promote reform by: 
(a) emphasising shared national interests and 
avoiding inflammatory language; 
(b) emphasising inclusion and promoting 
affiliations that cut across geographic, tribal 
and sectarian lines; and 
(c) seeking to broaden participation in reform 
efforts beyond professionals or members of 
the elite. 
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To the U.S. Government and Other Western 
Governments:  
1. Urge the Saudi government to adopt reforms 
that permit broader political participation; 
2. Place the issue of human rights violations and 
restrictions of civil rights on bilateral agendas; 
3. Avoid overemphasising socially and culturally 
sensitive issues, such as education and the role 
of religion; and 
4. Support and encourage efforts toward economic 
reform. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 
 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, 
non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 
staff members on five continents, working through field-
based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and 
resolve deadly conflict. 
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of 
political analysts are located within or close by countries 
at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent 
conflict. Based on information and assessments from the 
field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. ICG also publishes CrisisWatch, a 12-
page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular 
update on the state of play in all the most significant 
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the 
world. 
ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely 
by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries 
and international organisations and made generally 
available at the same time via the organisation’s Internet 
site, www.icg.org. ICG works closely with governments 
and those who influence them, including the media, to 
highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for 
its policy prescriptions. 
The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from 
the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media 
– is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and 
recommendations to the attention of senior policy-
makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and 
Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former 
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
ICG’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with 
advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London 
and Moscow. The organisation currently operates 
nineteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, 
Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, 
Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito, 
Sarajevo, Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi) with analysts 
working in over 40 crisis-affected countries and territories 
across four continents. In Africa, those countries include 
Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; 
in Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Indonesia, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; 
in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa 
to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia and the Andean 
region. 
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The 
following governmental departments and agencies 
currently provide funding: the Agence 
Intergouvernementale de la francophonie, the Australian 
Agency for International Development, the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
the Canadian International Development Agency, the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the German Foreign Office, the Irish Department 
of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency, the Luxembourgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the New Zealand Agency for International Development, 
the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Taiwan), the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the United Kingdom Department 
for International Development, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development.  
Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic 
Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford 
Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William 
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation 
Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John 
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open 
Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing 
Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of 
the Jewish Community Endowment Fund, the United 
States Institute of Peace and the Fundação Oriente. 
September 2004 
Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.icg.org 
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APPENDIX D 
 
ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2001 
 
 
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
A Time to Lead: The International Community and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East Report N°1, 10 April 
2002  
Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-
Israeli Peace Settlement, Middle East Report N°2, 16 July 2002 
Middle East Endgame II: How a Comprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian Settlement Would Look, Middle East Report N°3; 
16 July 2002 
Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria and Lebanon – How 
Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look, Middle East 
Report N°4, 16 July 2002 
The Meanings of Palestinian Reform, Middle East Briefing, 
12 November 2002 
Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border, 
Middle East Report N°7, 18 November 2002 
Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: A Legitimate Target?, Middle East Report N°13, 2 
April 2003 
A Middle East Roadmap to Where?, Middle East Report N°14, 
2 May 2003 
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap: What A Settlement Freeze 
Means And Why It Matters, Middle East Report N°16, 25 July 
2003 
Hizbollah: Rebel without a Cause?, Middle East Briefing, 30 
July 2003 
Dealing With Hamas, Middle East Report N°21, 26 January 
2004 (Executive Summary also available in Arabic and in French) 
Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking, Middle 
East Report N°22, 5 February 2004 (also available in Arabic and 
in French) 
Syria under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges, Middle 
East Report N°23, 11 February 2004 (also available in Arabic 
and in French) 
Syria under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges, Middle 
East Report N°24, 11 February 2004 (also available in Arabic 
and in French) 
Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab Citizens, Middle East Report 
N°25, 4 March 2004 (also available in Arabic) 
The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: 
Imperilled at Birth, Middle East Briefing, 7 June 2004 (also 
available in Arabic) 
EGYPT/NORTH AFRICA∗
Diminishing Returns: Algeria’s 2002 Legislative Elections, 
Middle East/North Africa Briefing, 24 June 2002 
 
 
∗ The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program 
to the Middle East & North Africa Program in January 2002. 
Algeria: Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia, Middle East/North 
Africa Report N°15, 10 June 2003 (also available in French)  
The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War, 
Middle East Briefing, 30 September 2003 (also available in 
Arabic) 
Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History, Middle 
East and North Africa Briefing, 20 April 2004 (also available 
in Arabic and in French) 
Islamism in North Africa II: Egypt's Opportunity, Middle East 
and North Africa Briefing, 20 April 2004 (also available in 
Arabic and in French) 
Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page, 
Middle East and North Africa Report Nº29, 30 July 2004 
IRAQ/IRAN/GULF
Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul, Middle East 
Report N°5, 5 August 2002 
Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath, Middle East Report 
N°6, 1 October 2002 
Voices from the Iraqi Street, Middle East Briefing, 4 December 
2002 
Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile 
State, Middle East Report N°8, 8 January 2003  
Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse That Roared? 
Middle East Briefing, 7 February 2003 
Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Maan, Middle East 
Briefing, 19 February 2003 
Iraq Policy Briefing: Is There an Alternative to War?, Middle 
East Report N°9, 24 February 2003 
War in Iraq: What’s Next for the Kurds?, Middle East Report 
N°10, 19 March 2003 
War in Iraq: Political Challenges after the Conflict, Middle 
East Report N°11, 25 March 2003 
War in Iraq: Managing Humanitarian Relief, Middle East 
Report N°12, 27 March 2003 
Baghdad: A Race against the Clock, Middle East Briefing, 11 
June 2003 
Governing Iraq, Middle East Report N°17, 25 August 2003 
Iraq’s Shiites under Occupation, Middle East Briefing, 9 
September 2003 
The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation 
and Regional Instability, Middle East Briefing, 8 October 2003 
(also available in Arabic) 
Iran: Discontent and Disarray, Middle East Briefing, 15 October 
2003 
Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Program, Middle East Report 
N°18, 27 October 2002 
Iraq’s Constitutional Challenge, Middle East Report N°19, 
13 November 2003 (also available in Arabic) 
Iraq: Building a New Security Structure, Middle East Report 
N°20, 23 December 2003 
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Iraq's Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise?, Middle East 
Report N°26, 8 April 2004 
Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge, Middle East Report N°27, 
27 April 2004 (also available in Arabic) 
Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?, Middle East Report N°28, 
14 July 2004 (also available in Arabic) 
Reconstructing Iraq, Middle East Report N°30, 2 September 
2004 
 
OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS 
For ICG reports and briefing papers on:  
• Asia 
• Africa 
• Europe 
• Latin America 
• Issues  
• CrisisWatch 
please visit our website www.icg.org  
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Stephen Solarz, Vice-Chairman 
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Gareth Evans, President & CEO 
Former Foreign Minister of Australia 
 
Morton Abramowitz 
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey 
Adnan Abu-Odeh 
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King 
Hussein; former Jordan Permanent Representative to UN 
Kenneth Adelman 
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency 
Ersin Arioglu 
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi 
Group 
Emma Bonino 
Member of European Parliament; former European Commissioner 
Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President 
Cheryl Carolus 
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former 
Secretary General of the ANC 
Victor Chu 
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong 
Wesley Clark 
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
Pat Cox 
Former President of European Parliament  
Ruth Dreifuss 
Former President, Switzerland 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark 
Mark Eyskens 
Former Prime Minister of Belgium 
Stanley Fischer 
Vice Chairman, Citigroup Inc.; former First Deputy Managing 
Director of International Monetary Fund  
Yoichi Funabashi 
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, 
Japan  
Bronislaw Geremek 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland 
I.K.Gujral 
Former Prime Minister of India 
Carla Hills 
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former U.S. Trade 
Representative 
Lena Hjelm-Wallén 
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Sweden  
James C.F. Huang 
Deputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan 
Swanee Hunt 
Founder and Chair of Women Waging Peace; former U.S. 
Ambassador to Austria 
Asma Jahangir 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, former Chair Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
Senior Advisor, Modern Africa Fund Managers; former Liberian 
Minister of Finance and Director of UNDP Regional Bureau for 
Africa  
Shiv Vikram Khemka 
Founder and Executive Director (Russia) of SUN Group, India 
Bethuel Kiplagat 
Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya 
Wim Kok 
Former Prime Minister, Netherlands 
Trifun Kostovski 
Member of Parliament, Macedonia; founder of Kometal Trade 
Gmbh  
Elliott F. Kulick 
Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S. 
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman 
Novelist and journalist, U.S. 
Todung Mulya Lubis 
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia 
Barbara McDougall 
Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada 
Ayo Obe 
President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria 
Christine Ockrent 
Journalist and author, France 
Friedbert Pflüger 
Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group 
in the German Bundestag 
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Victor M. Pinchuk 
Member of Parliament, Ukraine; founder of Interpipe Scientific and 
Industrial Production Group  
Surin Pitsuwan 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 
Itamar Rabinovich 
President of Tel Aviv University; former Israeli Ambassador to the 
U.S. and Chief Negotiator with Syria 
Fidel V. Ramos 
Former President of the Philippines 
George Robertson 
Former Secretary General of NATO; former Defence Secretary, UK 
Mohamed Sahnoun 
 Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa 
Ghassan Salamé 
Former Minister Lebanon, Professor of International Relations, Paris 
Salim A. Salim 
Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former Secretary General of 
the Organisation of African Unity 
Douglas Schoen 
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S. 
William Shawcross 
Journalist and author, UK 
George Soros 
Chairman, Open Society Institute 
Pär Stenbäck 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland 
Thorvald Stoltenberg 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway 
William O. Taylor 
Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S. 
Grigory Yavlinsky 
Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma faction, Russia 
Uta Zapf 
Chairperson of the German Bundestag Subcommittee on 
Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation 
Ernesto Zedillo 
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study 
of Globalization 
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Jay T. Snyder 
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